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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the relationship between religion and 
environmentalism within environmental movements. Particular 
attention is given to how that relationship varies according 
to the radical or reformist nature of each particular 
movement.
Two main arguments are presented. First, much of the 
previous research exploring the relationship between religion 
and environmentalism has failed to acknowledge the historical 
and structural nature of that relationship. Second, evidence 
of a relationship between religious belief and environmental 
behavior is likely to be found within radical environmental 
movements and not likely to be found within reformist 
environmental movements due to variance within these movements 
with regard to the degree to which they espouse lifestyles 
that significantly go against the grain of contemporary 
culture.
Literature written by the founders of two radical 
environmental movements, Deep Ecology and Social Ecology, and 
literature published by two reformist environmental 
organizations, Friends of the Earth and the National Wildlife 
Federation, are analyzed for content that demonstrates that 
these movements require of their adherents either acceptance 
or rejection of religious axioms.
As expected, literature from radical environmental 
movements strongly suggests that environmental behaviors 
within those movements are inspired by ideas that are 
religious in character. This was not found to be the case 
within reformist environmental movements.
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RADICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM AND RELIGION
INTRODUCTION
The following paper explores the relationship between 
religion and environmentalism within environmental movements. 
Particular attention is given to that relationship as it 
exists within radical, in contrast to reformist, environmental 
movements. I initially chose this topic after reading "The 
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis" by Lynn White Jr.
(1967), in which White makes the argument that modern science 
and technology, which have made our current "ecological 
crisis" possible, were highly influenced during their 
development by Judeo-Christian religion. From this he 
concludes that, "Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt" 
and calls for us to either, "find a new religion or rethink 
our old one" (White 1967; p. 1206). My initial intention was 
to explore White's thesis using an approach similar to that 
which has been used by many social researchers who have 
explored it, i.e. through survey research targeting variation 
in environmental attitudes as a function of religious 
affiliation. However, after reviewing several of such studies 
previously conducted and after returning to White's article 
multiple times, I gradually came to the conclusion that this 
type of survey research, when applied to White's thesis,
2
3misses the point. In retrospect, the reasons for this should 
have been obvious from the start.
First, to conduct a survey aimed at finding a negative 
relationship between Judeo-Christian religion and 
environmentalism on the basis of Lynn White's argument is akin 
to attempting to find a correlation between Protestant church 
attendance and Capitalist entrepreneurship within contemporary 
society on the basis of Weber's Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism. White's argument is very historical and 
very structural. He points out that the elements of 
Judeo-Christian ideology that shaped the developments of 
science and technology have become embedded in our 
contemporary secular institutions and are not upheld 
exclusively by Judeo-Christians. Although the axioms which 
guide environmental behavior may have historical foundations 
in Judeo-Christian religion, they have become secularized. 
Members of mainstream Western society may still adhere to 
these axioms, but they probably do so independent of personal 
religious beliefs.
Second, such research assumes that individuals who do not 
practice environmentalism have particular beliefs that 
actively keep them from doing so. In reality, no reason is 
needed not to practice environment-friendly behaviors. In
contemporary society, to maintain environmentally damaging 
daily practices requires little effort. It is among those who 
do practice environment-friendly behaviors, since such
4behaviors do require effort, that we may be more likely to 
find ideas that motivate people to act, especially if their 
actions deviate from that which is considered ordinary within 
our culture. Furthermore, if environmentalism is practiced 
within the context of a lifestyle which differs radically from 
that of mainstream culture, these ideas may have a religious 
character. However, it may or may not be Judeo-Christian 
religion in which they are founded. Therefore, when trying to 
locate these beliefs, it is necessary to use a definition of 
religion that encompasses both Judeo-Christian and 
non-Judeo-Christian religions. The definitions of religion 
used for this paper are derived from Emile Durkheim's The 
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
Convinced that it is among environmentalists, as opposed 
to non-environmentalists, that religious motivation for 
environmental behavior may be found, I chose to begin with 
environmental movements themselves and to search for religious 
ideology within those movements. This is in contrast to 
previous research, which begins by locating Judeo-Christians 
and surveying to find differences among them and between them 
and non-Judeo-Christians with regard to environmental 
attitudes and behaviors.
However, in the same sense that term "religion" denotes 
something much more complex than the distinction between 
Judeo-Christian and non-Judeo-Christian, the term
"environmentalist" does not simply refer to one broad category
5of people who "care about the environment." There are many
types of environmentalism and they vary considerably. At one
end of the spectrum, we may find those who value the
environment strictly for recreational purposes and whose
environmental behaviors do not extend beyond purchasing high
quality camping and recreational gear. At the other end,
wemay find those who intentionally practice ascetic,
subsistence-based lives which sharply go against the grain of
contemporary culture. Countless shades of environmentalism
exist between the two. Since different levels of
*
environmentalism can be expected to require different levels 
of personal effort and commitment, the type of ideology which 
maintains environmental behaviors, and the extent to which it 
is pertinent, may also vary. For this reason I chose to 
distinguish between radical and reformist environmental 
movements.
It is specifically within radical environmental movements 
that I expected religion to be a motivational force. It is 
within these movements that members advocate and attempt to 
lead lifestyles that, within the structure of contemporary 
society, require intense levels of commitment - so intense, 
that religious ideology may play an integral role in 
sustaining them. Therefore, literature from two radical 
environmental movements, deep ecology and social ecology, was 
analyzed for content to demonstrate that this is indeed the 
case. I have also included analyses of literature from two
6reformist movements to provide contrast with the radical 
movements.
As expected, literature from the radical environmental 
movements strongly suggested that environmental behaviors 
within those movements are inspired by ideas that are 
religious in character. This was not found to be case within 
reformist environmental movements.
CHAPTER I 
RELIGION AND ENVIRONMENTALISM:
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
For several decades, researchers, intellectuals, and 
non-academics alike have been expressing concern for the 
deterioration of our natural surroundings in the forms of 
resource depletion, species extinction, and the toxication of 
the air we breathe, the water we drink, and the soil in which 
we grow our food. Much effort has been spent on attempting to 
understand and explain the causes of these environmental 
changes which are viewed by most as problematic. 
Understandably, eagerness to locate quick and relatively 
painless solutions to environmental problems has often 
resulted in accusations of culpability aimed at particular 
individuals or groups of individuals, including consumers, 
corporations, governments, or even people of particular races 
or generations. As pointed out by William R. Catton, the 
author of Overshoot: The Ecological Basis of Revolutionary
Change (1982), "For mankind, as the pressure intensifies, 
ignorance of its [our environmental 'predicament'] most 
fundamental causes . . . makes it easy to succumb to the 
temptations to vilify particular human groups and individuals 
... While vilification often brings emotional gratification,
7
8it brings no solution to our common plight. Indeed, it
aggravates life's difficulties" (Catton 1982; p. 11).
Although certain groups of people may indeed be largely 
responsible for various particular ecological catastrophes and 
instances of environmental degradation, their identification 
and accountability is insufficient for addressing 
environmental issues if the foundational or structural 
variables which allow for such irresponsible environmental 
behaviors are not understood and addressed. However, the 
tendency, even within sociological research, to focus 
primarily on the individual when exploring environmental 
problems can interfere with the development of a clear 
understanding of the structural determinants of humanity's 
relationship with the natural environment. An example which 
illustrates this misplaced emphasis can be found in the 
responses of some social scientists to the Lynn White thesis.
During the past two decades, social science researchers 
have given considerable attention to the relationship between 
adherence to Judeo-Christian tradition and environmental 
beliefs and behaviors. Much of the research relevant to this 
relationship was inspired by the controversial Lynn White 
thesis, which was first presented in 1966 in an address to the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science and, in 
1967, published in an article in Science titled, "The 
Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis." In this article, 
White suggests that the Judeo-Christian foundation of Western
9society provided a supportive framework for the scientific and 
technological developments that would allow for massive 
natural resource exploitation and environmental degradation. 
Since then, much of the related research (Hand and Van Liere 
1984; Blocker and Ackberg 1989; Shaiko; 1987; Kanagy and 
Willits 1993), has claimed to address White's thesis 
specifically. However, critical analysis of the empirical 
literature reveals that much of this research provides only a 
narrow and incomplete picture of the relationship between 
religious affiliation on the one hand and beliefs and 
behaviors relevant to the natural environment on the other. 
Deficiencies have been due to both a lack of structural 
emphasis in the research designs and a lack of attention to 
non-Judeo-Christian ideologies, often of a religious or 
quasi-religious nature, held by participants in surveys.
As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, the 
lack of structural emphasis in research exploring Lynn White's 
thesis is attributable to a misunderstanding, or perhaps a 
misrepresentation, of White's thesis. White's claim that our 
current environmental crisis has historical roots in a period 
and culture that was guided predominantly by Judeo-Christian 
axioms appears to be misinterpreted by researchers as 
suggesting that individual Judeo-Christians currently hold 
beliefs that render them less likely than non-Judeo-Christians 
to be concerned with the condition of the natural environment. 
This misinterpretation is evidenced by the type of research
10
design that is, for the most part, standard for testing the 
Lynn White thesis - i.e. distribution of surveys that ask 
individuals a series of questions about their religious 
affiliation and then about their beliefs and behaviors 
relevant to-various environmental issues.
What is ignored in this body of research is the fact that 
nowhere in White's thesis does he discuss the relationship 
between religion and environmental beliefs or behaviors at the 
individual level. Furthermore, nowhere in his thesis does he 
claim that the relationship between religion and environmental 
beliefs and behaviors in contemporary society is a major 
source of environmental problems. He even points out that our 
current Western society is one which is guided predominantly 
by secular axioms whose relationships to religion are
historical (White 1967). Although White's is a provocative
argument with the potential to yield lively and productive 
sociological discourse on the relationship between religion 
and causes of and solutions to environmental problems, it is 
highly questionable to what degree a structural and historical 
argument such as White's can be adequately proven or disproved 
through distribution of surveys to individuals in contemporary 
society. However, this type of survey research appears to be 
a commonly used method within the field of sociology for 
exploring this topic. By employing such a method, it appears 
as if researchers abandoned the main thrust of White's 
argument in favor of finding out if contemporary Christians
11
are "the problem." By focusing attention exclusively on 
beliefs of the individual, the need for structural analysis 
and structural change is de-emphasized.
A second problem with much of this research is that it 
has been conducted as if a lack of relationship between 
Judeo-Christian affiliation and environmentalism implies a 
lack of affiliation between religion and environmentalism. 
For the most part, survey research pertaining to the 
religion-environment relationship has explored environmental 
beliefs and behaviors as functions of religious affiliation 
using categories drawn exclusively from mainstream American 
religious culture, that is, by making distinctions among 
religions sometimes no more complex than"Judeo-Christian or 
'other.' "Consistent neglect of any religious beliefs that 
are not defined by respondents as Judeo-Christian suggests 
that the researchers have defined religion as meaning only 
"Judeo-Christian religion." The empirical literature lacks 
discussion of the sociological nature of religious beliefs in
general and does not grapple with them as "... systems of
ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things, and 
give us a complete representation of the world" (Durkheim 
1915; p.165). Subsequently, any relationship between
religious ideology, outside of its manifestations in 
Judeo-Christian denominations, and the interactions between 
human and non-human nature is lost.
This exclusion of non-Judeo-Christian religious beliefs
12
is unfortunate since the results of many of these studies 
provide hints that many of the respondents whose beliefs fall 
within the "other" category not only have stronger 
environmental concerns than those who fall within the 
Judeo-Christian categories, but also that those who partake in 
lifestyles based on concern for the well-being of the natural 
environment are more influenced by ideology in this regard 
than are those who lead more mainstream lifestyles in relation 
to the natural environment (Chapters 3 and 4) . Yet, it is not 
always clear from the empirical literature exploring the 
relationship between Judeo-Christianity and environmental 
beliefs and behaviors what exactly those beliefs are which 
inspire greater concern for environmental issues.
Hence, in order to ascertain the existence of religious 
beliefs that may inspire more conscious awareness of and 
concern for the interrelationships between humans and the 
natural environments in which they exist, a broader definition 
of religion is needed, one which pertains to religious systems 
other than, though not excluding, Judeo-Christianity. The 
definition should apply to religion in general, not to any one 
specific religion or group of religions, and should be based 
on careful analysis of the most basic elements common to all 
religions, both past and present. The definitions of religion 
put forth in Emile Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of the 
Religious Life meet these criteria. In order to extract the 
most basic and essential elements and functions of religious
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life, Durkheim examines the earliest religious systems known 
to him, and about which there existed sufficient 
documentation, at the time of his writing (Durkheim 1915}. 
Specifically, he studies totemism among Australian and North 
American tribal communities. By exploring religious life in 
its most basic manifestation1, Durkheim extracts only what is 
substantially fundamental to religious life, allowing for 
definitions of religious and quasi-religious beliefs that 
would encompass those found among both Judeo-Christians and 
non-Judeo-Christians alike.
Similar to Lynn White (ch. 2), Durkheim views religion, 
in part, as reflective of society's understanding of the place 
humans occupy in the universe in relation to one another as 
well as in relation to the entities that comprise the nonhuman 
natural world. For Durkheim:
"All known religious beliefs, whether they are 
simple or complex, present one common 
characteristic: They presuppose a classification
of all things, real or ideal of which men think, 
into classes or opposed groups ... the profane and 
the sacred . . . When a certain number of sacred 
things sustain relations of coordination or 
subordination with each other in such a way as to 
form a system having a certain unity, but which is 
not comprised within any other system of the same 
sort, the totality of these beliefs and their 
corresponding rites constitutes a religion" 
(Durkheim 1915; p.52).
For Durkheim, recognition of sacredness is essential in 
order for a belief or body of beliefs to be properly defined
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as religious. He points out that, "...by sacred things one 
must not understand simply those personal beings which are 
called gods or spirits; a rock, a tree, a spring, a pebble, a 
piece of wood, a house, in a word, anything can be sacred" 
(Durkheim 1915; p. 52). This includes even words, actions or 
ideas. "The circle of scared objects ... varies infinitely, 
according to different religions. That is how Buddhism is a 
religion: in default of gods, it admits the existence of
sacred things, namely, the four noble truths and the practices 
derived from them" (Durkheim 1915; p. 52) . Thus, the presence 
of a belief in gods, deities, or otherworldly entities is not 
the crucial prerequisite for religion. What is necessary is 
simply a belief that certain entities are sacred.
What distinguishes an object as sacred is that it stands 
in absolute heterogeneity from the profane world (Durkheim 
1915; p. 53) . "The sacred and the profane have always and 
everywhere been conceived by the human mind as two distinct 
classes, as two worlds between which there is nothing in 
common" (Durkheim 1915; p.54). Because of this opposition 
between the sacred and profane, the two must not come in 
contact with one another. Therefore, in order to enter into 
relations with the sacred, a member of the profane world must 
undergo some sort of transformation that renders him suitable 
to the task. As Durkheim explains:
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"The sacred thing is par excellence that which the 
profane should not touch, and cannot touch without 
impunity. To be sure, this interdiction cannot go 
so far as to make all communication between the two 
worlds impossible; for if the profane could in no 
way enter into relations with the sacred, this 
latter could be good for nothing. But, in addition 
to the fact that the establishment of relations is 
always a delicate operation in itself, demanding 
great precautions and a more or less complicated 
initiation, it is quite impossible, unless the 
profane is to lose its specific characteristics and 
become sacred after a fashion and to a certain 
degree itself" (Durkheim 1915; p. 55).
Put in simpler terms, to recognize something as sacred is to 
recognize that one cannot interact with it in the same way 
that one would interact with profane objects. The sacred 
object or entity is seen as entirely apart from and 
independent of human intervention and is thus afforded 
venerable admiration and respect. Particular rights or 
interdictions must be observed in order for a profane being to 
interact with a sacred being. Through these rites or 
interdictions the profane being comes to take on sacred 
characteristics or itself becomes sacred. Positive rites and 
negative rights (interdictions) are not always simultaneously 
necessary. Often only one or the other is sufficient 
(Durkheim 1915). The following example can illuminate the 
relevance of the distinction between the sacred and the 
profane for the relationship between humans and the natural 
environment.
In current, dominant American culture, trees are not
16
viewed as sacred. They are considered profane. Because of 
their profane status, for those whose beliefs are consistent 
with those of the dominant culture, it is permissible to 
simply cut down a tree, or acres of trees, as long as no 
secular law forbids it. If trees were considered sacred, the 
process of cutting one down would suddenly become more 
complicated. Depending upon whether the culture responds to 
the sacredness of trees through positive rites or through 
interdictions, either certain, often symbolic, activities must 
be performed prior to cutting down the tree, cutting trees is 
simply prohibited, or members of the community are expected to 
abstain from cutting down trees or using products from trees 
unless under special circumstances recognized by the community 
as legitimate exceptions.
What distinguishes these rights and interdictions from 
the laws in secular society is that they are performed not 
because of enforcement by other human beings, but because the 
individual " . . .believes himself held to certain manners of 
acting which are imposed upon him by the nature of the sacred 
principle with which he feels that he is in communion" 
(Durkheim 1915; p.237). As will be discussed at greater 
length below, Durkheim points out that religious notions, such 
as those of the sacredness of certain objects or truths, not 
unlike secular ideas, ultimately are derived from society. 
However, religion can be more powerful than secular 
institutions in demanding conformity, since religion relies on
17
moral instead of physical force to impose its will. As 
Durkheim explains "The empire which it [society] holds over 
our consciences is due much less to the physical supremacy of 
which it has the privilege than to the moral authority with 
which it is invested. If we yield to its orders, it is not 
merely because it is strong enough to triumph over our 
resistance; it is primarily because it is the object of 
venerable respect" (Durkheim 1915; p.237). Hence, a community 
that relies solely on secular institutions for the 
determination of environmental practices among its members may 
be less likely to be successful at influencing its members to 
lead environment-friendly lifestyles than would be a community 
whose environmental beliefs and behaviors are determined by 
religion.
Central to Durkheim's understanding of the function of 
religion is the claim that the religious classification of all 
things sacred and profane into a system based on coordination 
or subordination is ultimately reflective of the system of 
coordination or subordination within the society of which the 
religion is a part. All things classified within a religious 
system are believed to share in "a vague power spread through 
these things" (e.g. "spirit" for Christians, "orenda" for the 
Iroquois, "wakan" for the Dakota) to which the religious cult 
is addressed (Durkheim 1915; p.228). This power is akin to 
and reflective of the power that is held over individuals by 
society. Society presents itself and is experienced as an
18
authoritative, moral force independent of the individuals of 
which it is comprised, and these moral forces readily lend 
themselves to religious representation in the form of gods, 
deities, or truths regarding a moral order inherent in the 
universe (Durkheim 1915). The idea of moral force itself has 
its roots in society:
" . . .the idea of power . . . does not come without 
those of ascendancy, mastership, and domination, 
and their corollaries, dependence and subordination 
... It is society which classifies beings into 
superiors and inferiors, into commanding masters 
and obeying servants; it is society which confers 
upon the former the singular property which makes 
the command efficacious and which makes power ... 
the first powers of which the human mind had any 
idea were those which societies have established in 
organizing themselves; it is in their image that 
the powers of the physical world have been 
conceived" (Durkheim 1915; p.409).
Hence, if the relationships among individuals in society are 
characterized by hierarchy, domination, or exploitation, the 
physical (i.e. natural) world will be conceived of in similar 
terms. Likewise, if the relationships among individuals in 
society are egalitarian, the natural world will be conceived 
of in egalitarian terms.
Since religious ideas ultimately reflect very real social 
forces, beliefs in supernatural entities or otherworldliness 
are not necessarily defining characteristics of religion. 
However, as mentioned above, the nature of social forces and 
the feelings aroused in the individual when acted upon by
19
these forces lend themselves well to personification in the 
form of otherworldly entities. Ultimately, though,
comparative analysis of religions (Durkheim 1915; Bookchin 
1991) , especially of those in communities described by 
scholars as "primitive" or "preliterate," reveals that beliefs 
in supernatural or otherworldly beings are not universal. At 
their most basic level, religious forces are not supernatural 
forces. Rather, "... the idea of society is the soul of 
religion. Religious forces are therefore human forces, moral 
forces" (Durkheim 1915; p 466). Therefore, the presence or 
absence of belief in supernatural or otherworldly entities is 
not sufficient to qualify or disqualify a set of ideas as 
being religious or quasi-religious in character. Rather, what 
is essential is that a set of ideas informs the individual as 
to the appropriate relationships between oneself and the human 
and nonhuman elements of the physical universe and as to the 
profane or sacred character of each of those elements. 
Furthermore, it is essential that it contains an 
authoritative, moral imperative that one act in accordance 
with those relationships.
With religious beliefs being characterized, in part, by 
an ordering of all things in the universe into a unified 
system of relationships, environmental issues (especially 
environmental ethics), when discussed from an ecological 
perspective, (i.e. a perspective which recognizes the 
relationships among all species within an ecosystem), seem
20
almost naturally to imply the need for clarification of 
religious or at least axiomatic perspectives. How individuals 
or communities go about development and consumption of natural 
resources should reflect how those individuals or communities 
see themselves in relation to those resources and the other 
natural entities with which those resources are shared. In 
fact, even the act of describing nature as "resources" in and 
of itself implies something about the way one's culture views 
the place of humans within the natural world. However, in a 
predominantly secular society, the axioms which guide behavior 
may be more readily discernible within secular institutions 
than within religion, regardless of the fact that many of 
those secular axioms have historically religious foundations. 
Hence, it should not be surprising to find, in survey 
research, considerable variability among Christians with 
regard to their environmental attitudes and behaviors, since 
such concerns are addressed primarily within the secular 
domain of mainstream American culture.
However, literature from and about certain environmental 
movements that advocate lifestyles contrary to those of the 
dominant culture does contain information indicating that 
paradigmatic ideologies of a religious or quasi-religious 
nature are pertinent to their objectives. This may suggest 
that beginning with the distinction between Judeo-Christian 
affiliation and non-Judeo-Christian affiliation and then 
observing for beliefs and behaviors relevant to the natural
21
environment may not be the best approach when looking for a 
relationship between religious beliefs and environmental 
beliefs and behaviors. By observing the differences among 
religions through only traditional definitions and 
distinctions, the importance of religious ideas that are not 
common to traditional religion can and often does go 
unrecognized. More informative results may be obtained by 
beginning with the presence or absence of participation in an 
environmental movement and then observing for religious or 
quasi-religious beliefs, as defined by Durkheim, that connect 
people to that movement. By analyzing religious ideas within 
the context of environmental movements and organizations, and 
by recognizing religious beliefs that exist outside of 
Judeo-Christian denominations, ideas that are more directly 
influential over environmental beliefs and behaviors may be 
more readily exposed. Specifically, among these ideas one 
could expect to find beliefs which accord sacred status to 
certain elements in, or all of, nature and accompanying moral 
imperatives that require that individuals and communities 
acknowledge this sacredness through their interactions with 
the nonhuman entities of the natural world.
It must first be recognized, however, that there is not 
simply one environmental movement in which all 
environmentalists are involved. Rather, "the environmental 
movement" is actually comprised of many distinct and separate 
social movements, some of them reformist and some of them
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radical, whose main concern is with the relationship between 
human society and the natural environment. Reformist 
movements are those which advocate changes through working 
within existing social, economic, and political frameworks. 
Radical movements are those whose adherents do not believe 
that working within existing social, economic, and political 
frameworks will bring about sufficient positive change. 
Instead, they call for widespread changes in the institutions 
and structures of society. The proposed changes are typically 
derived from ideologies which fundamentally challenge the 
society's existing dominant social paradigm.2
For example, the Deep Ecology movement is representative 
of a radical environmental movement. Its objective is the 
widespread acceptance of a biocentric worldview which is 
diametrically opposed to the anthropocentric worldview which 
currently dominates Western society. Social Ecology is
another example of a radical movement which calls for the 
replacement of current authoritarian and hierarchical social 
arrangements with more libertarian or anarchical ones in order 
to change the relationship between humans and the natural 
environment. Some of the more mainstream environmental 
organizations, such as the Environmental Defense Fund or the 
World Wildlife Federation would be appropriately defined as 
constituents in a reformist environmental movement insofar as 
their main objectives are to materially address particular 
environmental problems through working within existing social
23
institutions. Although they may legally challenge particular 
entities within the economic or political system, they do work 
within the system. They do not endorse an ideology or
worldview which poses any fundamental challenge to the 
dominant social paradigm, nor do they advocate disobedience to 
existing institutions in order to address environmental 
problems.
Since "religious interests are only the symbolic form of 
social and moral interests" (Durkheim 1915; p.356) and are 
reflective of the sentiments held in common by members of a 
given community or society (Durkheim, 1915), the type of 
environmental movement (radical or reformist) that informs or 
is reflected in one's ideas about environmental issues should 
affect the degree to which religious affiliation and 
participation are found to be related to environmental beliefs 
and behaviors. For example, an individual who supports a 
reformist environmental organization may do so without feeling 
or expressing any opposition toward the dominant social 
paradigm or the dominant social, political, or economic 
arrangements within which social life occurs, since reformist 
organizations advocate working within the current system and 
often address environmental problems on an issue by issue 
basis. As long as Judeo-Christian religions, for the most 
part, continue to reflect and support the dominant social 
paradigm, and that paradigm is not being challenged by the 
environmental organization with which a person is affiliated,
24
there is no reason why an individual could not claim to have 
both concern for environmental issues and Judeo-Christian 
affiliation.
On the other hand, an individual who is affiliated with 
a radical environmental movement, insofar as he is opposed to 
the dominant social paradigm, may not be as likely to claim 
affiliation with a religion that supports that paradigm. 
However, a lack of affiliation with a society's dominant 
religion in no way presupposes the absence of any religious
ideology which may guide both beliefs and behaviors in 
relation to the natural environment. On the contrary, if 
one's environmental concerns are informed by an entire social 
paradigm (as opposed to concern for a specific, concrete 
issue) , a variable that applies to. social life at the 
paradigmatic level, such as religious belief, is probably more 
likely to be related to the way one views the relationship 
between humans and nature and to one's environmental lifestyle 
and practices.
It should be recognized, however, that in discussing a 
radical environmental movement, we are discussing a movement,
and not an established community. The emphasis is still on 
the creation of a new way of thinking about and relating to
the natural environment. Because the desired community is one 
still in the process of becoming (and is usually not far along 
in that process) religious and quasi-religious sentiments may
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exist in the form of belief or ideology and not yet be 
manifest in the rituals and practices common to established 
religions. This is in contrast to established communities, 
such as those of traditional Native Americans who, for 
millennia, have lived according to worldviews contrary to that 
of the current dominant social paradigm. Their understanding 
of humanity's relationship to the rest of the natural world is 
not only thoroughly infused throughout the communities' 
day-to-day practices, but is also reflected in religious 
rituals and ceremonies. Because radical environmental
movements lack the history and the structure of established 
communities, religious or quasi-religious ideology may exist 
in the absence of corresponding rituals or ceremonies.
Furthermore, to remain consistent with Durkheim's theory 
of religion, it must be recognized that religious ideas 
emerging in contemporary society have far greater competition 
from other forms of knowledge than did religious ideas 
emerging centuries ago. Specifically, in order for new or 
rekindled religious beliefs to be accepted within current 
Western society, they must be supported by, or at least not 
stand in stark contradiction to, scientific understanding of 
the universe (Durkheim 1915).
In The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. Durkheim 
predicted that science, as an institution, would increasingly 
present itself as a rival to religion in terms of its role in 
explaining the relations among things. Throughout Elementary
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Forms. Durkheim reminds us that science was actually born of 
religion insofar as religion did originally fill the role of 
explaining these relationships. He states:
"Religion sets itself to translate these realities 
into an intelligible language which does not differ 
in nature from that employed by science; the 
attempt is made by both to connect things with each 
other, to establish internal relationships between 
them, to classify them and systematize them . . . 
scientific thought is only a more powerful form of 
religious thought. Thus it seems natural that the 
second should progressively retire before the 
first, as this becomes better fitted to perform the 
task" (Durkheim 1915; p. 477).
However, Durkheim states (1915), religion will not completely 
disappear in the face of science, since it fulfills the 
function of recreating society, or of life as it is perceived 
by the individuals in society. Religion creates and recreates 
the relationships that science presupposes in its explanations 
(Durkheim 1915). Furthermore, it is a source of "sensation 
and sentiment [that] too often take the place of logical 
reasons" (Durkheim 1915; p.478). Therefore, religion "seems 
destined to transform itself rather than disappear" (Durkheim 
1915; p. 478) . As a part of that transformation, however, 
religion becomes increasingly more accountable to science as 
a "...rival power [which] rises up before it ... [and] ever 
after submits it to its criticism and control" (Durkheim 1915; 
p.479) . If Durkheim's prediction is correct, any demand from 
radical movement adherents for a new religious paradigm will
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be accompanied by an insistence that religious claims 
regarding the status of nature as either sacred or profane be 
consistent with current scientific claims as to the 
relationships and connections between and among natural 
obj ects.
In survey research, individuals who adhere to religious 
or quasi-religious ideologies common to radical social 
movements have most likely fallen into the consistently used, 
yet largely neglected, category of "other" when coded 
according to their religious affiliation. Since this group 
accounts for a small minority of respondents, and since the 
widely varied groups within this "other" category are even 
smaller, location of a sufficiently large sample of 
respondents who fall within any particular group of the 
"other" category would be problematic.
Therefore, in order to identify religious ideas common 
to radical environmental movements it will be more practical 
to begin with the radical movements themselves, analyzing also 
reformist movements as a basis for comparison. In general, 
literature will be examined for content that advocates 
acceptance of social paradigms that are themselves religious 
or quasi-religious in content, or would require rejection of 
the current dominant social paradigm to such a degree that one 
could not adhere to both the proposed paradigm and 
Judeo-Christian teachings simultaneously. Since a Durkheimian 
model of religion will be employed, in order to qualify as
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religious or quasi-religious, the beliefs presented must 
pertain to the relationships among all things, both human and 
nonhuman, and recognize distinctions between the sacred and 
the profane. The literature must advocate lifestyles and 
practices in accordance with a fundamentally moral 
understanding of those relationships. Furthermore, the 
perceived system of subordination or coordination among things 
should have a counterpart in the communities to which they 
apply, whether these communities are established or still 
being proposed by constituents of particular movements. And, 
as described above, consistency with Durkheim1s theory of 
religion would also require that any emerging religious ideas 
could not stand in stark contradiction to what is known of 
relationships among things in the universe according to 
science.
First, however, since the majority of the research 
exploring the connection between religion and environmentalism 
claims to be testing the Lynn White thesis, a thorough review 
of that research and White's thesis is essential. Chapters 
two and three will present this review. Chapter two focuses 
primarily on White's thesis and explores the historical 
influence of Judeo-Christianity on modern science and 
technology. Judeo-Christianity's historical influence on 
capitalism, as described by Max Weber, is also discussed since 
an understanding of the relationship between capitalism and 
use of natural resources is seen by many social theorists as
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essential to a clear understanding of current environmental 
issues. Two arguments will be made: First, that Weber and
White both present structural and historical arguments, the 
validity of which can not be adequately assessed through 
survey research targeting individuals in contemporary, 
mainstream, Western society. Second, that the presence or 
absence of Judeo-Christianity is not nearly as important in 
determining one's relationship to the natural environment as 
would be the presence or absence of a belief that nature is 
sacred. In order for such beliefs to be illuminated in social 
research, the exclusive emphasis on Judeo-Christians must be 
eliminated in favor of an emphasis on religion in general. 
Therefore, a broader definition of religion that goes beyond 
the distinction between Judeo-Christian and
non-Judeo-Christian is needed.
The literature review for this project will be found in 
chapters three and four. Chapter three contains a review and 
discussion of various research exploring the Lynn White thesis 
and illustrates in more detail the inadequacies, which have 
been described above, in much of this research. Chapter four, 
however, reviews literature that was not conducted in an 
effort to explore Lynn White's thesis, yet provides a model 
which, it will be argued, could productively be used for that 
purpose. This research, conducted by Jeffrey C. Jacob and 
Merlin B. Brinkerhoff focuses on the role of quasi-religious 
ideology in maintaining alternative lifestyles among
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participants in the Back-to-the-Land movement. It will be 
demonstrated that Jacob and Brinkerhoff's method of defining 
religious or quasi-religious ideology from the perspective of 
those studied yields more useful information about the 
importance of religious ideology in maintaining alternative 
environmental lifestyles than would the use of definitions 
derived from the dominant culture whose values are rejected by 
radical movement adherents. It will then be explained how 
Jacob and Brinkerhoff' s work relates to the analysis of 
environmental movements and organizations discussed in 
chapters five, six, and seven.
Chapter five explores a radical environmental movement 
referred to as "deep ecology." Through analysis of literature 
written by the founders of this movement, it will be shown, 
using Durkheimian definitions, that the paradigmatic beliefs 
espoused by deep ecologists are, in fact, religious. 
Furthermore, it will be shown that deep ecologists' attitudes 
and behaviors toward nature are determined predominantly by 
religious ideology.
Chapter six explores another radical movement referred to 
as "social ecology." Again, literature written by the founder 
of the social ecology movement will be analyzed. It will be 
shown that, due to the extreme degree to which social ecology 
requires a radical rejection of the many of the values of 
dominant Western culture, Judeo-Christian affiliation would be 
nearly impossible for an adherent to social ecology's
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principles. It will also demonstrate that, although social 
ecology claims opposition to addressing environmental issues 
through religion, it does call for a "respiritualization" of 
nature that is religious or quasi-religious in character 
according to Durkheimian definitions.
Chapter seven explores literature published by two 
reformist environmental organizations, "Friends of the Earth" 
and the "National Wildlife Federation." These organizations 
provide a contrast to the radical environmental movements 
insofar as they do not require any radical departure from 
contemporary society nor any religious belief or lack of 
religious belief from their members. It will be shown that, 
whether fundamentalist Christian or atheist, or holding 
religious beliefs somewhere in between, an individual could 
adhere to the principles of these environmental organizations 
without thinking or behaving in contradiction to her or his 
religious convictions. Chapters five, six, and seven will 
each conclude with a discussion of the relationships between 
religion and environmental beliefs and behaviors that 
researchers could expect to find among individuals who are 
affiliated with the movements and organizations discussed in 
each chapter.
The final chapter will restate the claims at the 
beginning of this chapter regarding the application of survey 
research to the Lynn White thesis and the need for broader 
definitions of religion when exploring the relationship
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between religion and environmental behaviors. It will include 
a discussion of how the analyses in chapters five through 
seven will have supported or denied those claims and to what 
extent. This project will then conclude with discussions of 
the generalizability of the arguments made throughout this 
paper and of the importance of ideology or spirituality in 
understanding and effectively addressing environmental issues.
CHAPTER II
THE LYNN WHITE THESIS
The first major historical occurrence to which White 
(1967) draws attention in "The Historical Roots of Our
Ecological Crisis" is "(t)he emergence in widespread practice 
of the Baconian creed that scientific knowledge means 
technological power over nature" and considers this perhaps 
the "...greatest event in human history since the invention of 
agriculture, and perhaps in nonhuman terrestrial history as 
well" (p.1203). He traces this shift in cultural thought and 
practice generally to around 1850 and emphasizes the impact of 
"our race" upon the environment since that time, with the 
union of science and technology rendering humanity capable of 
environmental exploitation and destruction never before
thought possible.
Prior to the 19th century, according to White, Western 
science and technology occupied two distinctly different 
realms and followed courses of development independent of one 
another (1967: 1204). White very briefly traces the separate 
developments of Western science and technology over the past 
millennium and illustrates their importance insofar as modern 
science and technology are both distinctly occidental in
character. He does point out that Western science and
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technology "absorbed elements from all over the world" yet, 
"everywhere today . . . successful technology is Western . . . 
[and] all significant science is Western in style and method" 
(1967:1204) . Because of the global pervasiveness of Western 
science and technology, White feels it (as opposes to science 
and technology of other cultures) is most relevant to his 
analysis. Furthermore, he views Western science and
technology as acquiring their character and achieving world 
dominance during the middle ages and therefore enters into a 
discussion of the "Medieval View of Man and Nature" (1967: 
1204-1205) .
White focuses on changes in agriculture during this 
period since, "Until recently, agriculture has been the chief 
occupation even in 'advanced' societies" (1967: 1205). He
discusses the transition in northern Europe from use of the 
"scratch plow" to use of a more efficient plow which 
"...attacked the land with greater violence" (White 1967; 
1205). Because this new plow required the use of eight oxen 
(two were needed with the old plow), peasant families had to 
combine their oxen. "Thus, distribution of land was based no 
longer on the needs of a family but, rather, on the capacity 
of a power machine to till the earth . . . Formerly, man had 
been a part of nature; now he was the exploiter of nature" 
(1967; 1295) . White claims that the use of this type of 
agricultural implement was specific to northern Europe, 
suggesting that it is no mere coincidence that our modern,
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environmentally destructive technology "has been produced by 
descendants of these peasants of northern Europe" (1967:1205).
According to White, "novelties" such as that described 
above often coincide with the broader intellectual framework 
of a society. He points out that people's activities in 
relation to the environment are conditioned by their beliefs 
about their place or purpose in the world and the way they 
view themselves in relation to human and nonhuman elements 
with which they share it. More to the point, he states, 
"Human ecology is deeply conditioned ... by religion" (1967: 
1205) .
It is at this point in his argument that White discusses 
the relationship between Christianity and ecological 
destruction. He begins by claiming that, "The victory of 
Christianity over paganism was the greatest psychic revolution 
in the history of our culture" and goes on to explain that 
although the substance of our everyday lives may no longer 
appear to have any overtly Christian character, our lives 
continue to be guided by secular axioms, such as belief in 
perpetual progress, that actually have a Judeo-Christian basis 
(1967 : 1205) .
His argument is similar to that made by Weber in The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism insofar as Weber 
points out that, although the spirit of modern, rationalistic 
capitalism has a foundation in a form of Christianity 
(Protestantism), "...modern capitalism has become dominant
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and has become emancipated from its old supports" (Weber 1958; 
p. 72) . The work ethic, inspired by Calvinism, which gave 
modern Capitalism great impetus in its development, has been 
secularized to the point that its Christian origins are far 
from obvious (Weber 1958). Weber's analysis of the influence 
of religion in the development of Capitalism is equally 
important to our environmental crisis as White's analysis of 
the influence of Christianity on science and technology, since 
Capitalism (as well as Socialism) , with its emphases on 
unrestricted growth and . continually increasing material 
production and consumption, has also been recognized by many 
theorists as particularly destructive to the natural 
environment on a global scale. Thus, the effects of our 
current technology on the natural environment cannot be fully 
understood without recognition of the fact that it is utilized 
and controlled within our current Capitalist system which, 
like science and technology, was significantly influenced by 
Judeo-Christian religion during the course of its development.
White's emphasis on currently secular concepts which have 
Judeo-Christian foundations, as opposed to current religious 
beliefs found within Judeo-Christian denominations, is highly 
relevant but, as will be demonstrated later, appears to have 
been ignored in much of the research that has been conducted 
to explore Lynn White's thesis. White does not claim that an 
individual's adherence, in current Western culture, to Judeo- 
Christian beliefs and practices will cause him to approve of
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or engage in environmentally destructive behaviors. In fact, 
he points out that we are currently in what is referred to by 
some as the "post-Christian age" (1967:1205) with Christianity 
being far less directly influential than it once had been.
The point he makes is far more structural. What is 
relevant to our current ecological crisis, according to White, 
is that science and technology (like Capitalism) , which are no 
longer dependent on God for justification of their pursuits, 
developed their character during a time and in a place in 
which Christianity was highly and directly influential (1967). 
For this reason, White explores the question, "What did 
Christianity tell people about their relations with the 
environment?" (1967: 1025).
The first element of Judeo-Christian belief to which 
White draws attention is the creation story. It is relevant 
to our environmental crisis for two reasons. First, belief in 
the existence of a beginning of the world coincides with a 
belief in linear, as opposed to cyclical, time (White, 
1967:1205). It has been argued (Deloria 1994) that a linear 
concept of time is more amenable than a cyclical concept of 
time to a belief in perpetual progress. This belief in 
perpetual progress is thought by many environmental and social 
theorists (Deloria 1994; Gould and Schnaiberg 1994; Catton 
1980; Bookchin 1982; Mander 1991) to contribute significantly 
to our current problems with resource depletion and 
accumulation of toxins.
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Judeo-Christian teachings not only describe the world as 
having a beginning, but also as having an end. Jacques LeGoff 
discusses the importance of this belief in his book, Time. 
Work, and Culture in the Middle Ages. (1980) . He points to an 
eschatological Christian belief that the world must be 
physically transformed in order to fulfill the prophecy of the 
second coming of Christ (1980, p.31). According to LeGoff, 
during the medieval period, any vocation that did not involve 
transformation, modification, or improvement in the physical 
world was considered inferior. Those who did not create were 
perceived as condemned (LeGoff 1980).
Conceptions of time also appear to affect societies' 
interpretations of the sacred. In societies with nonlinear 
conceptions of time, mysticism is often expressed through 
spatial concepts (LeGoff 1980, p.39), with places and objects 
in nature most likely to be attributed sacred status (DeLoria 
1994). In societies with linear conceptions of time, such as 
those with Judeo-Christian foundations, historical events are 
more likely to be attributed sacred status, therefore 
decreasing the need for sacred places and natural monuments 
(DeLoria 1994). Removing the sacred from the physical, 
natural world and placing it within the nonphysical temporal 
realm subsequently removes interdictions against the 
exploitation or destruction of places within nature that 
formerly would have been protected by virtue of their sacred 
status.
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As described above, by asserting the existence of a 
beginning and end of the world, and therefore a linear 
conception of time, the Judeo-Christian tradition transformed 
the relationship between man and nature (White 1976). This 
transformation occurred in part due to the compatibility of 
the linear concept of time with the idea of perpetual 
progress, the compatibility of the linear concept of time with 
the positive valuation of the transformation of nature, and 
through the transference of the sacred from the spatial to the 
temporal realm. This only partially explains, however, the 
importance of the creation story in transforming the 
relationship between humans and nature.
The second point White makes regarding the significance 
of the creation story is that it established man's dominion 
over nature (1967:1205). According to the creation story, 
explains White, "God planned all of [creation] explicitly for 
man's benefit and rule: no item in physical creation had any 
purpose save to serve man's purposes" (White 1967, p.1205). 
White points out (1967: 1206), that man's dominion over nature 
as established in the creation story can be interpreted in 
various ways. This is reflected in some of the research 
(Kanagy and Willits 1993; Hand and Van Liere 1984; Shaiko 
1987) which suggests that members of various Christian 
denominations may view humans as being given by God the roles 
of stewards and caretakers of the Earth as opposed to simply 
being given full license to dominate and exploit nature
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without restriction. However, given the historical and 
structural emphases of White's argument, one must ask if, with 
the exception of extreme fundamentalism, current individual 
interpretations of the Book of Genesis are at all relevant to 
our current ecological crisis from White's perspective since 
White's focus (like Weber's) is not on current interpretations 
of Christianity. It is on the historical influence of 
Judeo-Christian tradition on the development of modern science 
and technology.
The importance of the secularization of what were once
distinctly Judeo-Christian concepts (e.g. linear concept of 
time, belief in perpetual progress, man's dominion over 
nature, accumulation of wealth as a sign of God's grace, the 
desirability of the increased production of goods for human 
use) should not be underestimated. These concepts have become 
so deeply entrenched within modern secular institutions that 
their Judeo-Christian foundation is likely to go unrecognized 
by most individuals. For example, when engaging in American 
political discourse, if one speaks of the need for "growth" or 
"progress," these ideals are not only taken for granted as 
being positive for American society, but they are discussed 
entirely in terms of secular interests (e.g. income, jobs, 
standard of living, competitiveness within a global economy). 
It is atypical for "growth" and "progress" to be discussed in 
terms of preparing the world for the second coming of Christ, 
acting on behalf of the "greater glory of God, " or with any
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explicit reference to Judeo-Christian beliefs whatsoever.
Although Judeo-Christian religion may have been highly 
influential in and supportive of the development of the 
science, technology, Capitalism and the secular axioms that 
contribute significantly to the environmental problems with 
which we are currently confronted, these institutions and 
beliefs have become independent of their Judeo-Christian 
foundations and continue to develop without any direct 
influence from religion, Judeo-Christian or otherwise. 
Because the Judeo-Christian concepts which provided the 
framework for our current secular institutions have become 
thoroughly absorbed into secular institutions, religious 
variables are not likely to be as powerful as secular 
variables in predicting environmental behaviors among people 
who lead mainstream lifestyles and generally accept the 
secularized beliefs inherent in the dominant social paradigm. 
Yet, researchers have continually tested Lynn White's thesis 
through surveys asking individuals about their religious 
affiliation (Judeo-Christian or "other") and their 
environmental beliefs and/or behaviors.
In addition to the specific content of the Judeo-Christian 
creation story, White emphasizes the more general influence 
of Christianity on the human-nature relationship through its 
"victory over paganism" (1967:1205). As he explains, in 
pre-Christian, pagan cultures, all elements in nature were 
thought to contain guardian spirits, which were accessible to
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but very unlike humans. These guardian spirits had to be 
placated prior to the use or alteration of natural objects and 
places (1967:1205). With Christianity, spirits (or, more 
specifically, saints) were entirely anthropocentric in form 
and no longer to be found in natural objects. Rather, they
enjoyed "a citizenship in heaven" (White 1967: 1205). Thus, 
"By destroying pagan animism, Christianity made it possible
(emphasis added) to exploit nature in a mood of indifference 
to the feelings of natural objects...The spirits in natural
objects, which formerly had protected nature from man, 
evaporated. Man's effective monopoly on spirit in this world 
was confirmed, and the old inhibitions to the exploitation of 
nature crumbled" (White 1967:1205).
This facet of White's argument does not suggest that 
Christian teachings urge humanity to go out and carelessly 
exploit or destroy nature. Rather, it suggests that 
Christianity removed the cultural restraints (belief in pagan 
animism) that may have at least created obstacles against, if 
not prevented, blatant environmentally destructive behaviors 
and developments. This may appear to be a fine distinction, 
but it is an important one. Given the degree to which 
Judeo-Christian concepts allowing for the exploitation of 
nature have been secularized, would the absence of 
Judeo-Christian religion, in and of itself, be sufficient to 
change beliefs and behaviors that affect the natural
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environment? Or, would the presence of a specific belief in 
the sanctity of nature for nature's sake (that belief which 
was removed by Christianity) be necessary to change attitudes 
and behaviors relevant toward nature in a direction that would 
result in widespread individual lifestyle changes and 
community practices which are less damaging to the natural 
environment? Furthermore, in order for such a belief to firmly 
take hold, would it not require rejection of many of the 
dominant values within current Western society? If so, it is 
among people who lead environmental lifestyles outside of the
mainstream or live according to the ideologies of radical
environmental movements that a belief in the sacredness of 
nature could be found. Furthermore, such beliefs could not be 
easily identified in research that does not employ definitions 
of religion that include those religious systems which 
identify nature, not just otherworldly deities or gods, as 
sacred. This distinction between the presence or absence of 
Christianity and the presence or absence of belief in the 
sanctity' of nature has been largely ignored in research on the 
religion-environment connection and will be discussed in the 
next chapter.
Finally, White discusses the influence of the 
Judeo-Christian tradition specifically on science, which he 
describes as developing from natural theology. He claims that 
in the Latin West, unlike the Greek East, "by the early 13th 
century, natural theology was following a very different bent.
44
It was ceasing to be the decoding of the physical symbols of 
God's communication with man and was becoming the effort to 
understand God's mind by discovering how his creation 
operates" (1967:1206). He explains that, with much
consistency, major scientists "explained their motivations in 
religious terms" until the late 18th century and therefore, 
"...modern Western science was cast in a matrix of Christian 
theology" (1967: 1206). As stated above, it was around 1850 
that this Judeo-Christian-influenced science began to merge 
with technology (White 1967, p. 1203), in effect presenting 
man with capabilities of manipulating and transforming his 
environment on a scale not previously thought possible.
In summary, White's is a structural and historical 
argument that emphasizes the historical influence of 
Judeo-Christian religion on the development of science and 
technology. It does not suggest that Jews or Christians in our 
present society are likely to be less concerned with the 
environment than non-Judeo-Christians by virtue of the fact 
that they are Judeo-Christian. It does not suggest that those 
who engage in environmentally destructive behaviors do so on 
the basis of their personal religious beliefs any more so than 
Weber's argument would suggest that Capitalist entrepreneurs 
in current society are motivated in their pursuits primarily 
by a desire to prove themselves among those chosen by God as 
the "elect." If White's thesis is correct, even if 
Christianity were to cease to exert any direct influence over
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individuals in our society, our environmental problems would 
remain. The institutions in our society that have strong 
historical-Christian influences (e.g. science, government, 
economy) have become secularized to the point where their 
motives and functions are no longer determined by religious 
considerations and they are not in need of Christian doctrine 
to justify or guide developments.
Furthermore, even if Christianity ceased to exert any 
influence, the fact would remain that the majority of people 
in Western culture (i.e. those who adhere to the dominant 
social paradigm) do not demonstrate any belief that nature is 
sacred. And this belief, it may be argued, is highly likely
to exert influence over one's behavior toward the natural 
environment. Therefore, taking the emphasis off of
Christianity and placing it on religion in general may 
illuminate religious beliefs that are more likely to correlate 
with environmental behaviors. However, the importance of 
sacredness, along with the historical-structural emphasis of 
White1s argument appears to have been ignored in much of the 
empirical literature that claims to be "testing the Lynn White 
thesis."
CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW: PART ONE
One of the earliest and probably most frequently cited 
sociological studies pertaining to Lynn White's thesis was 
conducted in 1984 and was titled, "Religion, Mastery-Over- 
Nature, and Environmental Concern." In this study, Carl M. 
Hand and Kent D. Van Liere examine the relationship between 
religious identification and commitment, mastery-over-nature 
orientation, and concern for environmental problems. Through 
analysis of survey data designed to measure these three 
variables, they conclude that, "...Judeo-Christians are 
generally more committed to the mastery-over-nature 
orientation than non-Judeo-Christians, but that this 
commitment varies considerably among denominations" and that, 
"commitment to the mastery-over-nature orientation is 
instrumental in shaping concern for environmental problems" 
(Hand and Van Liere 1984, p.555). Although the results of 
this study may tell us something about individual attitudes 
toward the mastery-over-nature orientation in relation to 
individual attitudes about the environment, do they tell us 
anything that significantly supports or challenges Lynn 
White's thesis? According to the authors of this study, it
does. They write, "Although White does not directly address 
the relationship between religion and environmental concern at 
the individual level, it is logical to hypothesize that 
individuals more committed to the Judeo-Christian tradition 
will more strongly accept the dominance of nature doctrine and 
subsequently have lower levels of concern for environmental 
problems" (Hand and Van Liere 1984, p.556).
Whether or not the hypothesis itself is logical, it does 
not logically derive from Lynn White's thesis. The break in 
continuity from the individual to society is a large one and 
the relationship between the two should not be assumed. 
"...Society is not the mere sum of individuals, the system 
formed by their association represents a specific reality 
which has its own characteristics ... Consequently, every time 
a social phenomenon is directly explained by a psychological 
phenomenon, we may rest assured that the explanation is false" 
(Durkheim 1982, p.129). Therefore, an assessment which uses 
the individual as the unit of analysis may not be 
independently sufficient to support or challenge a structural 
claim such as White's.
Hand and Van Liere's lack of attention to structure in 
assessing the Lynn White thesis is not only noteworthy because 
White's argument is a structural argument, but also because
many of the problems related to our environmental crisis are 
structural problems (Gould and Schnaiberg 1994; Mander 1991;
Catton 1980; Bookchin 1982). For example, even if an
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individual does not believe in the mastery-over-nature 
orientation, in order to address needs that she is faced with
in her day to day life, such as providing food for her
children, heating her home, or getting to work each day, she 
is likely to participate in activities that contribute to 
environmental problems, especially if she is immersed in 
dominant Western culture. The food that she purchases was 
probably grown with the use of agricultural implements that 
were fueled with nonrenewable resources, the same type of 
resources that are most likely used to heat her home and
mobilize the vehicle which gets her to work each day. Does
this mean that she is not concerned with environmental 
problems? No. Does this mean that she is most likely
Christian? No. It simply means that she exists within a
social structure in which responding to practical needs
usually involves the consumption of some natural, and in many 
cases, nonrenewable resource. Bringing White into the 
equation, the large-scale resource extraction that is 
necessary to maintain this social structure was made possible 
by the historical, Judeo-Christian foundation of Western 
science and technology that lacked sanctions or taboos against 
environmental exploitation. This same foundation played a
large part in the formation of modern Capitalism (Weber 1958), 
which, to a large extent determines the degree to which 
science and technology is used for environmentally 
exploitative purposes (Gould and Schnaiberg 1994; Mander 1994;
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Bookchin 1991).
However, much of the research that has been conducted on 
Lynn White's thesis (Shaiko 1987; Eckberg and Blocker 1989; 
Kanagy and Willits 1993) has been similar to Hand and Van 
Liere' s in design. That is, it has analyzed the
religion-environment connection through the use of individual 
surveys which ask about religious affiliation and practices 
and then about environmental beliefs. And, in light of most 
of the results, it should be conceded that individual 
religious beliefs are related to environmental beliefs, with
Judeo-Christian religion inspiring a mastery-over-nature 
orientation, which subsequently has a negative effect on 
pro-environmental beliefs. However, as will be explained
below, research that examines the connection between religious 
affiliation and environmental behaviors reveals a different
relationship, one which may suggest that researchers have 
failed to recognize a very important set of other religious 
variables.
In a study by Kanagy and Willits (1993) titled, "A 
Greening of Religion? Some Evidence from a Pennsylvania 
Sample," the authors explore the relationship between 
Judeo-Christian affiliation and practices and environmental 
behaviors. The latter are assessed through measures of 
consumption behaviors and social/political action. They
measure environmental attitudes and beliefs, using items from
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the New Environmental Paradigm (NEP) scale devised by Dunlap 
and Van Liere (1978) for measurement (Appendix A) . The NEP 
measures the acceptance, or lack of acceptance, of ideas that 
can be classified into three categories: "the need to preserve 
the balance of nature; the belief that growth should be 
limited in order to sustain the environment; the notion that 
humans are part of, rather than the rulers of, nature" (Kanagy 
and Willits 1993; p.676). Many of the ideas which comprise 
the NEP conflict with those of the dominant social paradigm. 
Analysis of the data revealed that:
"To the extent that church attendance was 
associated with attitudes which were not supportive 
of the (NEP), it lessened participation in 
environmentally protective activities ... However 
... when these environmental attitudes (those 
contained in NEP) were controlled, religiosity (as 
indexed by church attendance) was, positively, not 
negatively, associated with environmentally 
protective behaviors" (Kanagy and Willits 1993;
p.681).
This analysis suggests that, within Judeo-Christian 
denominations that do not promote ideas that are incompatible 
with concern for the environment, higher levels of 
participation in worship services and religious activities 
areactually positively related to environmental behaviors.
According to Kanagy and Willits, this suggests that 
environmental behaviors are significantly influenced by 
religious involvement. They state, "It is important to
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recognize that [the] positive effect of religious 
participation is not conditioned by acceptance of ideas 
contained in the NEP, but rather by other ideas which 
apparently support environmental activity... and are linked 
with religiosity"3 (1993; p.680-682). Kanagy and Willits 
suggest that these "other" religious ideas that have an 
influence on environmental behavior are rooted in the 
Judeo-Christian "Biblical notion of stewardship" (1993; 
p. 6 82) . This may be the case, in part, when looking 
exclusively at those who claim Judeo-Christian affiliation. 
However, this explanation does not account for the fact that 
non-Judeo-Christians are still shown to have stronger 
pro-environment beliefs and behaviors than Judeo-Christians. 
Perhaps the assumption that the "other" ideas in the equation 
are of Judeo-Christian origin is a bit narrow.
Within the last decade or so, American culture has seen 
a proliferation of books, videos and other various media which 
focus on non-Judeo-Christian religious and spiritual 
traditions. Many of the concepts presented in this media have 
roots in Eastern mysticism, the cultures of indigenous peoples 
throughout the world, such as those of Native Americans, or of 
Western cultures that existed in a bygone, pre-Christian era, 
such as those of Celtic or Wiccan spirituality. Many of these 
"alternative" religions are strongly based on a fundamental 
belief in the Earth, or in nature and its inhabitants, as 
sacred. The introduction, or in many cases, reintroduction of
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these religious systems (or at least highly watered-down 
versions of them) into popular, mass-marketed culture has not 
resulted in any widespread denunciation of Christianity or 
mass return to pagan animism. The majority of Americans have 
not abandoned their roles as workers, consumers and active 
participants in our economic system nor have they undergone a 
rebirth into subsistence-based lives conducted in harmony with 
the cycles and balance of nature .
However, as described by Dunlap and Van Liere (1984), 
"Events of the past two decades - decline in military 
supremacy, increased social conflict, serious pollution and 
material shortages, decline in economic growth, and a virtual 
freeze in the standard of living - have all presumably shaken 
people's faith" in the dominant beliefs of our culture (Dunlap 
and Van Liere 1984; p. 1205). They further explain that, as 
these dominant beliefs have been shaken, alternative 
viewpoints have emerged to challenge them. The environmental 
movement in particular "has evolved to the point where it now 
offers an 'ecological worldview' as a full-fledged alternative 
to the DSP (Dominant Social Paradigm)" (Dunlap and Van Liere 
1984; p.1025). Furthermore, in a study conducted by Dunlap 
and Van Liere exploring acceptance of the NEP (1978) , this 
ecological worldview was found to be accepted, not only among 
members of environmental organizations, but among the majority 
of members of the general population as well.
If indeed a new worldview is being presented and is
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slowly emerging among some segments of our population, it 
would logically follow that religious or quasi-religious 
sentiments inherent in or reflective of that worldview would 
come to be more commonly accepted. The recently acquired 
variety of items on popular book store and novelty shop 
shelves which purport to have their foundations in the 
religions of non-Judeo-Christian cultures, may serve to both 
inform and reflect a newly emerging openness to spiritual 
beliefs that coincide with the alternative worldview offered 
by the NEP or by some of the more radical constituents of the 
environmental movement. However, given the power of secular 
institutions in determining individual behavior toward the
natural environment, openness to alternative spiritual beliefs 
among individuals who live in mainstream American culture does 
not imply participation in environmental behaviors that 
reflect those beliefs.
One reason for this lack of correlation is described by 
Dunlap and Van Liere who advise against assuming that the high 
level of acceptance of the NEP (which contains predominantly 
secular axioms) found in their 1978 study correlates with 
positive changes in behavior toward the natural environment:
"...the link between attitudes and behavior is 
often rather tenuous, especially when dealing with 
very general attitudes such as those embodied in 
the NEP . . . Consequently, it would be naive to 
expect individuals who endorse the NEP to 
consistently engage in behaviors congruent with
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this new worldview. Also . . . the public may
hold 'inconsistent' attitudes, endorsing
contradictory ideas without perceiving the conflict 
between them . . . Therefore, it is quite likely that 
many of those who endorse the NEP . . . hold other 
attitudes and engage in behaviors which are not 
congruent with the NEP" (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; 
p.17).
A very significant portion of the research on 
environmental attitudes (Dunlap and Van Liere 1984; Dunlap and 
Tremblay 1978; Harry 1971; Hamilton 1984; Stern et al. 1993; 
George and Southwell 1986; Longstreth et al. 1989) cautions
against the assumption that openness within mainstream culture 
to religious or quasi-religious environmental concepts implies 
that environmental attitudes and behaviors within mainstream 
culture are primarily determined by such beliefs. This
research examines variables other than religion (i.e. secular 
variables), such as age, sex, income, residence, occupational 
prestige, political ideology or party affiliation, marital 
status and presence or absence of dependents. Several of these 
variables, especially income and education, have consistently 
been found to be related to concern for the environment. With 
religion no longer occupying the center of our culture 
(Hammond 1985), many social behaviors, especially those 
related to consumption and material lifestyle, are likely to 
be primarily determined by secular institutions.
As discussed above, it has become increasingly difficult 
for individuals who live in mainstream American culture to get
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through day-to-day life without altering the natural 
environment in which they exist. Of course, throughout 
history, it has been impossible for humans (or any species for 
that matter) to exist without altering the natural environment 
somewhat. However, in recent decades, humans have altered the 
environment to such a great extent that varying degrees of 
that alteration have come to be defined by many as 
environmentally destructive - a definition that typically 
implies that the environment is altered in such a way that it 
becomes less inhabitable for humans from a utilitarian and 
sometimes even aesthetic perspective. For the majority of 
individuals who accept the dominant social paradigm, who 
choose to participate in mainstream culture, and who are often 
unaware of alternative lifestyles as viable options, 
participation in this destructive level of environmental 
alteration is practically unavoidable. Modern methods of 
getting to work, lighting a room, grooming, cooking, and many 
forms of interpersonal communication now require the use of 
energy that cannot be renewed. Most household cleaning agents 
and hygiene products are environmental contaminants. Many of 
the items we consume on a daily basis are produced in 
factories that emit literally tons of toxins into our water, 
air, and soil during the course of their production. To 
reduce the use of nonrenewable resources, environmental 
contaminants, and products that are manufactured through 
environmentally destructive methods to any significant degree
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has come to be viewed and experienced as highly inconvenient 
at best. And, depending upon household income, it is highly 
unrealistic as well, especially in light of the fact that 
alternative methods of alleviating (or even reevaluating) the 
material needs of a family are seldom presented in popular 
media, which recreates itself by continually espousing mass 
consumption and consumer-oriented lifestyles (Gould and 
Schnaiberg 1994; Mander 1991; Bookchin 1982) . In other words, 
for an individual in contemporary society to behave in a way 
that is environmentally destructive, neither a Biblical 
mandate nor a religious prescription is necessary.
However, to drastically reduce what are often defined as
environmentally destructive behaviors, which for most are no 
more intentional than any unconscious habit, would require an 
incredibly intense, and very conscious effort. To initiate
and endure such behavioral changes would require that one' s 
beliefs and desire to live in harmony with nature in today's 
world be quite strong - so strong that it may take on a 
religious character. If so, these religious or
quasi-religious beliefs would not be the same as those that 
support the dominant social paradigm, since that paradigm 
clearly must be rejected to live such an alternative 
lifestyle. If one is a member of an established community 
that has a history or tradition of living according to values 
contrary to those of dominant Western culture, such as a
57
traditional Native American community, the ideologies that 
reflect his perceived relationship to the natural environment 
are likely to be observable in the beliefs and practices of 
the community. However, almost by definition, the majority of 
Americans live within, or were at least raised within, 
mainstream culture. Individuals from this group who wish to 
live, or are learning to live, alternative environmental 
lifestyles, may rely on the ideologies of those established 
communities of which they are not members, or on the 
ideologies espoused in radical environmental movements for 
guidance. Therefore, respondents who are affiliated with 
radical environmental movements and report participation in 
alternative lifestyles characterized by positive environmental 
behaviors may report some very strong nontraditional beliefs 
that guide their behavior. Furthermore, if asked, they may 
describe these beliefs as religiously or spiritually inspired.
In light of this possibility, researchers should not 
confine their analysis of variables to the presence or absence 
of Judeo-Christian religion in relation to environmental 
beliefs and practices. Rather, they should actively be 
searching for the presence or absence of religious beliefs 
that support a view of nature, regardless of its material 
utility, as sacred or that endorse a simple, non-consumerist, 
even relatively ascetic lifestyle. If elements of such 
beliefs are by chance found among Christians, as they may be 
among those who are affiliated with reformist environmental
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organizations, these beliefs may have a foundation in Biblical 
scripture. However, they also may be reflected in religious 
beliefs that are simply not Judeo-Christian in origin. The 
days have long since passed when individuals in Western 
society were commonly and severely persecuted for beliefs that 
may ring of paganism, and it is reasonable that practicing 
Christians may be open to the sacralization of nature, either 
for its intrinsic value or as a part of God's creation, 
especially in consideration of current environmental problems. 
Shaiko reported (1987) that 90% of environmental activists 
come from Judeo-Christian homes although 42% of them declared 
themselves non-Judeo-Christian at the time of his survey. 
This certainly challenges any claim that a modern 
Judeo-Christian upbringing or background prevents one from 
acquiring pro-environmental attitudes.
Among non-Judeo-Christians, evidence of religious beliefs 
regarding the sanctity of nature would most likely be found 
among respondents who claim to be religious or spiritual but 
declare no Judeo-Christian affiliation. Unfortunately, 
researchers have typically categorized these individuals with 
atheists in their studies exploring the connection between 
religion and environment. For example, Hand and Van Liere 
(1984), in their study on "Religion, Mastery-Over-Nature 
Orientation, and Environmental Concern," coded respondents who 
were Judeo-Christian as "0" and those who declared their 
religious affiliation to be "none," "belief in God, no
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religion," "agnostic" and "atheist" identically as "1." 
Kanagy and Willits (1993) simply deleted from their study all 
respondents who claimed that their religious affiliations were 
"other" than Judeo-Christian denominations. Shaiko (1987) 
coded identically, those claiming "no religious affiliation" 
and those claiming "no affiliation but close ties with 
nature." If researchers were to code separately respondents 
who make such claims as "belief in God, no religion" or "no 
affiliation but close ties with nature" or "agnostic" or 
"other," instead of coding them as identical with individuals 
who have no religious belief, they may find variance in 
environmental attitudes among non-Judeo-Christians. The lack 
of attention to variance within this group is surprising, 
considering that non-Judeo-Christians consistently report 
higher levels of concern about environmental issues than their 
Judeo-Christian counterparts.
This consistently higher level of environmental concern 
among "religious others" may suggest that, if there are any 
religious beliefs which have an effect on one's relationship 
with nature, they would more likely be found among this 
"other" group than among Judeo-Christians. If this is indeed 
the case, instead of focusing on Judeo-Christians in an effort 
to prove the existence of a lack of environmental awareness or 
concern, researchers would do well to shift attention to the 
"other" group, in an effort to ascertain whether there exist 
religious beliefs among respondents which encourage not only
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environmental awareness and concern, but particular 
environmental behaviors as well. The next chapter reviews 
some literature which suggests that this may be a productive 
approach.
CHAPTER IV
LITERATURE REVIEW: PART TWO
As stated in previous chapters, analysis of environmental 
movements themselves in terms of their radical or reformist 
character may expose religious or quasi-religious ideas that 
influence active participation in lifestyles that are less 
destructive to the natural environment than those of 
mainstream culture. Research on the Back-to-the-Land Movement 
(Jacob and Brinkerhoff 1986; Jacob and Brinkerhoff 19 87) 
supports the idea that this may be a fruitful method for 
exploring the religion-environment connection.
The Back-to-the-Land Movement "consists primarily of 
former urban residents, many of them born and raised in rural 
areas, returning to the non-metropolitan countryside to take 
up residence and practice simple, semi-subsistence agriculture 
on small parcels of land" (Jacob and Brinkerhoff 1987, p.63). 
Values that are typically espoused by members of the 
Back-to-the-Land Movement are described by Jacob and 
Brinkerhoff (1987) as quasi-religious. They include such 
conceptions as ecological wholeness, voluntary simplicity and 
self-reliance. Literature supporting the back-to-the-land 
movement, such as Mother Earth News, countryside, and
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Farmstead magazines, reflects many of these values through
addressing such issues as environmental protection as well as 
personal freedom through self-reliance and subsistence living 
(Jacob and Brinkerhoff 1986, p.45). In a study conducted in 
1986 titled, "Alternative Technology and Part-time, 
Semi-subsistence Agriculture: A Survey from the
Back-to-the-Land Movement," Jacob and Brinkerhoff explore the 
degree to which the values of the back-to-the-land movement 
adherents actually correspond with those values presented in 
the literature and the degree to which espousal of these 
values predicts participation in back-to-the-land behaviors. 
Jacob and Brinkerhoff assess the values of the 
back-to-the-land movement members through measures of 
self-reliance, voluntary simplicity, Earth care, inner peace, 
and what they refer to as a "back-to-the-land worldview" (a 
composite of several of the items used for measurement in the 
other categories) . They also employed a variety of
demographic variables including childhood residence, 
education, income, land size, years at residence, marital 
status and age. To assess back-to-the-land behavior, they 
measured each respondent's use of 25 alternative, or "soft," 
technologies. They found that the personal values described 
above "proved to be the best predictors of use of alternative 
technologies, whereas residential, family, and demographic 
characteristics were relatively poor predictors. This 
indicates that ideology is an important element in sustaining
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alternative rural lifestyles" (Jacob and Brinkerhoff 1986, 
p.43) .
In a study conducted in 1987 titled "Quasi-Religious 
Meaning Systems, Official Religion, and Quality of Life in an 
Alternative Lifestyle: A Survey from the Back-to-the-Land
Movement," Jacob and Brinkerhoff analyzed the power of the 
same back-to-the-land values as in the previous study, as well 
as that of variables that measure involvement in traditional 
Judeo-Christian religion, to predict perceptions of quality of 
life among back-to-the-land movement adherents. The focus of 
the study was the relationship between religious ideas and 
quality of life among individuals who participate in 
alternative lifestyles. Although the topic of this research 
(quality of life) is not directly relevant to the problem 
currently at hand, both the theoretical arguments and the 
results of the data analysis presented in the article, when 
taken together with the research described in chapter 3, are 
relevant. Specifically, they lend support to the idea that 
religious variables are more likely to have predictive value 
with regard to environmental behaviors among those who 
demonstrate consistently and significantly positive 
environmental lifestyles and practices than among those who 
demonstrate more mainstream lifestyles or typical 
environmental behaviors.
As stated by Jacob and Brinkerhoff, "The justifications 
for a return to rural lifestyles in an expanding popular
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literature . . . take on an aura of religiosity - communion with 
nature, responsibility for care of the earth, self reliance, 
etc." (1987, p.64). They also point out that, "Perhaps the 
most religiously explicit elements in back-to-the-land 
ideology are those that focus on ecological integrity and 
wholeness. The sources of these concerns are drawn from 
Eastern mysticism, Native American religions, and traditional 
Christianity" (1987, p.64). If this is indeed the case, with 
the exception of those concepts which are drawn from 
traditional Christianity, there are important religious ideas 
that may have gone unnoticed in much of the research exploring 
the relationship between religious beliefs and environmental 
behavior (chapter 3) due to weakness in the research designs 
which virtually ignore or discount any religious beliefs that 
do not have Judeo-Christian origins.
Furthermore, with regard to the respondents in their 
sample, Jacob and Brinkerhoff claim, "While over half (57.6 
percent) claim no current denominational identification and 
nearly two-thirds (65.5 percent) report church attendance of 
less than monthly, 72.8 percent report they were at least 
average in terms of being religiously minded" (1987, p.66). 
Obviously, lack of Judeo-Christian affiliation does not imply 
lack of religion. "...(A)lthough a relatively high percentage 
of the sample's respondents classified themselves as 
'religious nones,1 they nevertheless subscribed to relatively 
high levels of a value system with definite religious
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overtones; one that emphasizes ecological wholeness, simple 
living, and self-reliance" (Jacob and Brinkerhoff 1987, p.78) .
After analyzing the relationship between official 
religion, (measured by denominational affiliation, church 
attendance and general religiosity) and use of alternative 
technologies among back-to-the-land movement adherents, Jacob 
and Brinkerhoff found no consistent pattern of relationship, 
positive or negative (1987, p.72). When analyzing the 
relationship between unofficial religion (back-to-the-land 
ideology), however, they found the quasi-religious variables 
to be the strongest predictors of environmental behaviors, 
even when compared to the effects of demographic variables 
(Jacob and Brinkerhoff 1987, p.72).
Their findings with regard to the relationship between 
religion and quality of life (the actual focus of the study) 
lead Jacob and Brinkerhoff to the conclusion that, "Perhaps 
much of the problematic nature of the relationship of religion 
to QOL (quality of Life) has been a function of failing to 
operationalize religious belief within the context of the 
lived experience of those studied" (1987, p. 78) . The same can 
be said about the problematic relationship of religion to 
environmental behavior. Similar to the adherents to the back- 
to-the-land movement, adherents to other radical environmental 
movements are adherents to an alternative worldview and
lifestyle. Consequently, explaining their behavior through 
the use of categories relevant primarily to the dominant
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culture (i.e. Judeo-Christian v. "all others"), will not be 
nearly as instructive as attempts to explain their behavior 
through categories relevant to the characteristics of their 
distinctive cultures (i.e. biocentric worldview v. 
anthropocentric worldview, voluntary simplicity v. 
consumerism/materialism).
As discussed in previous chapters, in a highly 
secularized society, religious beliefs may have less 
predictive potential for those who live "in the mainstream" 
than for those who choose to live outside of it, especially 
where environmentalism is concerned. Currently, in our 
society, to live in a way that is environmentally destructive 
often requires very little, if any, conscious effort. 
Alternative environmental lifestyles, on the other hand, 
require effort. Not only does subsistence living require the 
acquisition of specific skills and knowledge, but it requires 
rejection of many of the values of the dominant culture - 
values that are reinforced each time one turns on a 
television, flips through a popular magazine, or has contact 
with other members of that culture. In order for a person to 
remain true to his or her alternative worldview, the beliefs 
that comprise that worldview must be incredibly strong - so 
strong that they can and often do take on a religious 
character. For this reason, there may revealed a relationship 
between religious beliefs and environmental behavior if the
beliefs being explored are those of an alternative culture or
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subculture, such as those common to radical environmental 
movements.
Jacob and Brinkerhoff's work on the relationship between 
religion and quality of life provides a model that, if 
followed, may be more suitable to exploring the relationship 
between religious belief and environmental practices than the 
models used in much of the research that has been exploring 
this connection over the past decade or so. Instead of asking 
samples of individuals who are immersed in mainstream secular 
culture whether or not they are Christian and then whether or 
not they recycle or have reduced consumption, we should be 
accessing both established communities and developing 
movements that, overall, advocate, through words or behavior, 
lifestyles that are substantially less damaging to the natural 
environment than that which is typical in most of our society. 
Once these communities or movements have been identified, then
we should searching for religious or quasi-religious ideology 
within those communities or movements that determines human 
behavior toward the natural environment.
The lifestyles of Back-to-the-Land movement adherents, as 
described by Jacob and Brinkerhoff, are characterized by some 
values that are espoused within two radical environmental 
movements - "deep ecology" and "social ecology." Similar to 
proponents of deep ecology, many, though not all, 
Back-to-the-Land Movement adherents share in a biocentric 
worldview that "...all life is of equal worth and that
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consequently, human life has no necessary priority over any
other form of life" (Jacob and Brinkerhoff 1987; p. 65) . With 
social ecology, back-to-the-land movement adherents share a 
commitment to "... a rejection of the
high-consumption/high-technology of mainstream culture and . . . 
concerns [that] center on personal freedom derived from the 
control of basic productive, if only subsistence, resources 
. . . There is a definite philosophical anarchism . . . that 
colors much back-to-the-land thinking" (Jacob and Brinkerhoff 
1986; p.43-44). In light of Jacob and Brinkerhoff's findings, 
these ideological similarities with the back-to-the-land 
movement suggest that deep ecology and social ecology may be 
ideal places to begin searching for religious or 
quasi-religious ideology within radical environmental 
movements. It is within these movements that participants are 
expected to live according to principles which stand in 
contrast to the DSP to a degree that may require religious 
ideology as a motivating or sustaining force.
Those affiliated with reformist movements are probably 
more likely, in comparison to those with no ties to any 
environmental organization, to have higher levels of concern 
for environmental issues, and may advocate recycling, species 
protection, protection of national parks, etc.. Ultimately, 
however, there is no reason to predict that they would be 
found to lead environmental lifestyles that are significantly 
different from those of mainstream culture, since radical
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lifestyles are not encouraged by reformist environmental 
organizations. Because, as discussed in previous chapters, 
religious beliefs are not necessary to maintain lifestyles in 
keeping with the DSP, ideas of a religious nature would not 
necessarily be found within the literature of reformist 
organizations or movements. Neither would one expect to 
find, within reformist literature, insistence upon the 
rejection of any particular religious paradigm which supports 
the DSP. Through analysis of the philosophies and objectives 
of reformist movements, it should become clear how affiliates 
of Judeo-Christian denominations, and non-affiliates alike, 
can maintain their religious beliefs and simultaneously 
express concern for environmental issues, since participation 
in reformist movements does not require rejection of the 
dominant social paradigm.
The analyses in the following chapters will focus on the 
extent to which environmental organizations and movements are 
either radical or reformist in character and the potential of 
these movements, based on their philosophies and objectives, 
to influence the relationship between religious beliefs and 
environmental behaviors among participants. Durkheimian 
theory will be used as a basis for defining ideas as 
"religious" or "quasi-religious." Highly influential texts 
which have informed Social Ecology and Deep Ecology, which are 
radical environmental movements, will be analyzed in terms of 
the philosophies and objectives of each particular movement
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and the degree to which these philosophies and objectives are 
religious or quasi-religious. Social Ecology and Deep Ecology 
have been chosen not only because they are radical movements, 
but also because their ideological differences have been the 
cause of an ongoing and rather heated debate between the 
primary spokesmen of each movement. Appropriately enough, the 
major point of disagreement is regarding the degree to which 
religious ideologies and practices should be invoked in 
response to environmental issues. Deep Ecology places a heavy 
emphasis on the need for spirituality in changing attitudes 
toward the natural environment. Social ecology scathingly 
opposes adherence to any beliefs in otherworldliness or 
mysticism in responding to environmental problems. By 
choosing movements that severely diverge from one another on 
the issue of the role of religion in addressing environmental 
problems, it is hoped that this analysis will be 
representative of radical movements that fall in various 
locations on the spectrum of religious v. secular emphasis. To 
provide a contrast to these radical movements, literature from 
the national Wildlife Federation and Friends of the Earth will 
be analyzed as representative of reformist movements. The 
literature will include that which has been provided by each 
organization in response to requests for information 
pertaining their philosophies and objectives and through 
literature published and authored by these organizations.
CHAPTER V
DEEP ECOLOGY
Deep Ecology, described by some as a philosophy and 
others as a social movement, is derived from the work of 
Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, who introduced the concept 
in a brief article written in the early 70's titled, The
Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements (Sale 1988;
Bookchin 1988). In 1984, in collaboration with George 
Sessions, Naess first published what he and Sessions 
considered to be the basic principles for deep ecology, (Sale 
1988; p. 670-671) . "Since 1973 deep ecology has developed 
into a broad philosophy that has close connections to other 
currents in the environmental movement such as bioregionalism, 
environmental direct action, and animal rights" (Bookchin 
198 8; p. 10). Although the foundations of deep ecology were 
first elaborated by Naess in the early 70's, the book Deep 
Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered, written by George
Sessions and Bill Devall, has come to be regarded as "the 
bible" of the movement (Bookchin 1988). Therefore, the 
sources for the ensuing analysis include Deep Ecology, along 
with an article titled, The Deep Ecological Movement: Some
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Philosophical Aspects by Arne Naess, and an interview with 
Naess titled, Simple in Means, Rich in Ends.
Naess describes deep ecology by contrasting it to what he 
refers to as "shallow ecology," which is characterized by 
anthropocentric approaches to environmental issues and seeks 
only short-term solutions for immediate alleviation of 
specific environmental problems (Naess 1993) . Deep ecology is 
characterized by an ecocentric or, as some prefer, biocentric 
approach which seeks to address the broader, ideological 
issues that are seen by deep ecologists as contributing 
significantly•to, if not creating, environmental problems in 
general. Its emphasis is on long-term change through 
challenges to many of the fundamental presuppositions of 
Western culture (Naess 1993) . Naess describes deep ecology as 
"... a practical environmental ethic based on either a deep or 
more fundamental philosophic or religious perspective, and on 
a set of norms resting on intrinsic values" (Naess 1993; 
p.196) .
One of the most significant characteristics that 
distinguishes deep ecology from shallow ecology is its 
biocentric worldview. From a biocentric (or ecocentric) 
viewpoint, as opposed to an anthropocentric one, humans are 
not considered to have any more intrinsic value or worth than
any other species or life form. Furthermore, they are not 
viewed as having any inherent right to dominate or exploit
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other life forms for purposes beyond that which is deemed ("by 
whom" is not made clear in the literature) necessary for 
survival. Naess states, "One of the basic norms of deep 
ecology is that every life form has in principle a right to 
live and blossom. As the world is made, of course, we have to 
kill in order to eat, but there is a basic intuition in deep 
ecology that we have no right to destroy other living beings 
without sufficient reason" (Naess 1993; p. 184). Thus, for 
deep ecologists, nature does not exist within the realm of the 
profane. There exist interdictions within deep ecology which 
prohibit the interference in or use of nature, to the point 
where, unless absolutely necessary for survival, the vital 
needs of the nonhuman elements in nature should be put before 
the non-vital needs of humans (Naess 1993; p.202-203). These 
interdictions against subjugating nature to the interests of 
the profane world suggests that, for deep ecologists, nature 
is sacred.
These interdictions are not imposed by secular law or 
institutions. Rather, they are arrived at through a "basic 
intuition" felt by the deep ecologist. For deep ecologists, 
environmental behaviors are not determined by promise of 
reward or threat of sanction, but because of a feeling toward 
nature that is felt on an emotional level. According to 
Naess, "Conservation strategies are more eagerly implemented 
by people who love what they are conserving, and who are 
convinced that what they love is intrinsically lovable" (Naess
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1993; p. 196). Naess states that this "intuition" about 
"intrinsic values in nature," which is the common attitude 
that defines one as a deep ecology adherent (Naess 1993; p. 
208) is akin to a religious feeling. He claims:
"People who have done the most to make societies 
aware of the destructive way in which we live in 
relation to nature have had such religious feelings 
... Some will say that nature is not man's 
property, it's the property of God; others will say 
it in other ways. Deep ecology may be said to have 
a religious component, fundamental intuitions that 
everyone must cultivate if he or she is to have a 
life based on values and not function like a 
computer" (Naess 1993; p. 186).
The ecocentric worldview that recognizes all of nature as 
having intrinsic worth independent of usefulness to humans is 
reflected in deep ecologists' recommendations for addressing 
environmental problems. For example, when describing the 
"deep" approach to land and sea ethics, Naess states:
"The Earth does not belong to humans. For example, 
Norwegian landscapes, rivers, flora, fauna, and the 
neighboring sea are not the property of Norwegians. 
Similarly, the oil under the North Sea or anywhere 
else does not belong to any state or to humanity. 
And the 'free nature' surrounding a local community 
does not belong to the local community. Humans 
only inhabit the lands, using resources to satisfy 
vital needs. And if their non-vital needs come in 
conflict with the vital needs of nonhumans, the 
humans should defer to the latter ..." (Naess 1993; 
p.202-203) .
Throughout the literature, deep ecologists repeatedly
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emphasize the need to base environmental policy decisions not 
solely on economic, political, or scientific considerations, 
but according to basic, fundamental principles, such as those 
of the ecocentric worldview. According to Naess, "The deep 
ecology movement connects rationality with a set of 
philosophical or religious foundations ... (1993; p.207) it is
essential that fundamental attitudes and beliefs are involved 
as part of the motivation for action" (1993; p.200).
The fundamental attitudes and beliefs to which Naess 
refers are considered to be "ultimate premises" from which are 
derived all beliefs regarding the relationships between humans 
and nature (Naess 1993; p. 206) . In The Deep Ecology Movement:
Some Philosophical Aspects, Naess presents a diagram which
illustrates how rules and decisions regarding the environment 
should be derived from these ultimate premises or 
"ecosophies." Of level 1 in the diagram, which contains the 
ultimate premises, Naess states, "...some sentences at the top 
( = deepest) level are normative, and are preferably expressed 
by imperatives. This makes it possible to arrive at 
imperatives at the lowest level: the crucial level in terms of 
decisions ... Thus there are 'oughts' in our premises as well 
as in our conclusions" (Naess 1993; p. 204-205). By asserting 
the need for ultimate premises which contain imperatives, and 
from which all conclusions and decisions are to be derived, 
Naess is advocating obedience to principles which are deemed 
inviolable and beyond question. In this sense, these premises
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are sacred, just as the natural world to which they refer is 
sacred. According to Naess, any environmental policy decision 
which is not based on these premises is questionable. He 
states, "If environmentally oriented policy decision is not 
linked to intrinsic values or ultimates, then its rationality 
has yet to be determined. The deep ecology movement connects 
rationality with a set of philosophical or religious 
foundations" (Naess 1993; p. 207) .
This adherence to ultimate, undeniable, sacred truths, 
along with deep ecology's sacralization of nature, is a 
defining characteristic of deep ecology as a religion for the 
same reasons that Durkheim defines Buddhism as a religion 
(Chapter 1) . As a matter of fact, Naess lists Buddhism, along 
with Christianity and various philosophies, among the ultimate 
premises from which deep ecology's principles are derived 
(Naess 1993; p. 206). He further states:
"There is an intimate relationship between some 
forms of Buddhism and the deep ecology movement.
The history of Buddhist thought and practice, 
especially the principles of nonviolence, 
non-injury, and reverence for life, sometimes make 
it easier for Buddhists to understand and 
appreciate deep ecology than it is for
Christians, despite a (sometimes overlooked) 
blessedness which Jesus recommended in peacemaking"
(Naess 1993; p. 208).
Thus, deep ecology openly asserts the need for a new way of 
addressing environmental issues, one which is based ultimately 
on religious and philosophical presuppositions. From these
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"ultimate" or foundational premises are derived eight 
principles of deep ecology, which he lists in lieu of giving 
a single precise definition of the movement (1993; p.196-197). 
These principles are also listed in Deep Ecology (Sessions and 
Devall 198 8):
(1) The well-being and flourishing of human and nonhuman 
life on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: 
intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are 
independent of the usefulness of the nonhuman world for 
human purposes.
(2) Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to
the realization of these values and are also values 
in themselves.
(3) Humans have no right to reduce this richness and 
diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
(4) The flourishing of human life and cultures is 
compatible with a substantially smaller human population. 
The flourishing of nonhuman life requires a smaller human 
population.
(5) Present human interference with the nonhuman world is 
excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening.
(6) Policies must therefore be changed. These policies 
affect basic economic, technological and ideological 
structures. The resulting state of affairs will be 
deeply different from the present.
(7) The ideological change will mainly be that of 
appreciating life quality (dwelling in situations of 
inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly 
higher standard of living. There will be profound 
awareness of the difference between bigness and 
greatness.
(8) Those who subscribe to the forgoing points have an
obligation directly or indirectly to try to 
implement the necessary changes.
In addition to the eight principles outlined above, deep
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ecologists promote a lifestyle that they claim "is most 
conducive to cultivating ecological consciousness and to 
asking the basic questions of values and ethics..." which are 
described above (Sessions and Devall 1985; p.65) . They 
describe this lifestyle as the "minority tradition" and 
contrast it to the "dominant position" (Sessions and Devall 
1985; p.18-19), a term which basically refers to current 
social arrangements within Western culture. The minority 
tradition differs from the dominant position in that the 
minority tradition is characterized by small-scale, 
decentralized communities with nonhierarchical social 
structures, whereas the dominant position is characterized by 
larger communities with centralized authority and government 
through bureaucratic and hierarchical institutions. The 
minority tradition relies on self-responsibility, local 
autonomy, and leadership by example for upholding the ideals 
of the community. This is in contrast to the use of police, 
government regulation, and leadership by holding instruments 
of violence that is characteristic of the dominant position 
(Sessions and Devall 1985; p. 18-19). The minority tradition 
encourages mutual aid, communalism and simplicity of wants as 
opposed to the competition and encouragement of production and 
consumption encouraged by the dominant position (Sessions and 
Devall 1985; p. 18-19). The minority tradition replaces 
secular authority, Church monopoly over religious ritual, and 
uniformity of ideology with respect for spiritual-religious
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mentors, full community participation in rituals, and 
tolerance for a variety of religious experiences. Perhaps the 
difference that is most distinctly relevant to deep ecology is 
that the minority tradition advocates "more open communication 
with nature" and adheres to a broader definition of community 
which includes plants and animals, whereas the dominant 
position perceives nature as "data" or "natural resources," 
and adheres to a narrow definition of citizenship, which 
includes only humans (Sessions and Devall 1985; p. 18-19) . 
Living according to the minority tradition, and according to 
deep ecological principles, requires a subsistence-based 
lifestyle such as that found among Back-to-the-Land movement 
adherents (Chapter 3). That the minority tradition espoused 
by deep ecologists is diametrically opposed to the dominant 
world view, or dominant social paradigm, to such a great 
extent as that described above, qualifies it as a radical 
environmental movement. Furthermore, unlike social ecology, 
which will be discussed in Chapter 6, its religious content is 
readily discernible.
Deep ecologists openly assert, throughout their writings, 
that their movement's principles are drawn from a variety of 
established religions and philosophies including Buddhism, 
Taoism, religions of primal peoples including Native 
Americans, and even Christianity (Naess 1993; Sessions and 
Devall 1985). Naess repeatedly asserts that these religious 
foundations are essential to deep ecology and that, " . . .
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supporters of deep ecology act from deep premises. They are 
motivated, in part, from a philosophical or religious 
position" (Naess 1993; p. 207). He further states:
"In deep ecology, another major question is how to 
get along with the various religious populations - 
Christians, Buddhists, and other - in which a 
minority, especially the young, is completely aware 
of the destruction of the planet and believes that 
it must not be permitted. We must cooperate with 
these religious movements because, as I've 
mentioned, the motivation for strong action must 
come from deep sources in philosophy and ethics" 
(Naess 1993; p. 190).
Thus, in addition to the premises and principles of deep 
ecology having a religious character of their own, deep 
ecologists openly insist that environmental issues be 
addressed according to traditional ideologies that have 
retained their religious character into the present, i.e. that 
have not become secularized, as have many of the ideologies of 
mainstream Western culture which historically have religious 
foundations.
Perhaps most in keeping with Durkheim's model of religion 
is deep ecology's concern with establishing the nature of the 
relationships among humans and all other life forms. For deep 
ecologists, as discussed above, all things in the universe 
have equal value and intrinsic worth independent of their 
usefulness to humans and are related non-hierarchically (Naess 
1993; Sessions and Devall 1985). The status attributed to 
nature by deep ecologists is akin to that of being sacred
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insofar as any action that harms the earth or its inhabitants 
is forbidden unless it is necessary for human survival. The 
nature of the relationships among humans and nonhumans is not 
determined or enforced by secular law, but is understood and 
explained through acknowledgment of a shared participation in 
"a vague power spread through [all] things" (Durkheim 1915; p. 
228). "Most people in deep ecology have had the feeling ... 
that they are connected with something greater than their ego, 
greater than their name, their family, their special 
attributes as an individual ... Insofar as ...these deep 
feelings are religious, then deep ecology has a religious 
component" (Naess 1993; p.185-186).
This emphasis on shared participation and connectedness 
with the universe is most explicitly demonstrated by "Ecosophy 
T," which is the name that Naess gives to his own ecosophy, or 
fundamental principle, that guides his relationship with the 
natural world (Naess 1993). According to Ecosophy T, one 
should ultimately strive toward Self-realization, which is 
achieved through maximizing relationships with other life 
forms. "Viewed systematically, not individually, maximum 
self-realization implies maximizing the manifestations of all 
life ... This leads to a hypothesis concerning an inescapable 
increase of identification with other beings when one's own 
self-realization increases. As a result, we increasingly see 
ourselves in other beings, and others see themselves in us" 
(Naess 1993; p.209). The degree to which Naess believes it
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possible to achieve this self-realization is evidenced by his 
description of his own relationship with the universe. He 
states, "... the universe is growing, and I feel that I am 
growing with the universe; I identify with the universe - the 
greater the universe the greater I am ... we can be just as 
big as the cosmos in a sense. We ourselves, as human beings, 
are capable of identifying with the whole of existence" (Naess 
1993; p.182-183) .
But deep ecology does not merely describe the 
relationships among life forms in the universe. This 
description is accompanied by a moral imperative that 
individuals act in accordance with the fundamental premises 
which pertain to this system of coordination among things in 
order to maximize diversity, and therefore, maximize 
Self-realization. Naess strongly advocates living a
relatively ascetic lifestyle in order to act in accordance 
with deep ecology's ecocentric worldview and goal of 
increasing diversity. He states, "People who successfully 
maintain a low standard of living and successfully cultivate 
a deep, intense sense of life are much better able to 
consistently maintain a deep ecological view and act on behalf 
of it ... I can ask myself ... what would be the minimum means 
necessary to maintain these enjoyable feelings and situations" 
(Naess 1993; p.191). Without this representative form of 
asceticism, the principles of deep ecology could not be fully 
defined as religious or quasi-religious since "...asceticism
83
is not a rare, exceptional or nearly abnormal fruit of the 
religious life ... it is one of the essential elements. Every 
religion contains it, at least in germ, for there are none in 
which a system of interdicts is not found" (Durkheim 1915; 
p.351). As stated earlier, the interdictions found in deep 
ecology are based on a fundamental belief that, "... every 
life form has in principle a right to live and blossom . . . 
there is a basic intuition in deep ecology that we have no 
right to destroy other living beings without sufficient reason 
. . . for • deep ecology, there is a core democracy in the 
biosphere" (Naess 1993; p.184-185).
Not only do deep ecologists recognize a "core democracy 
in the biosphere" which forbids destruction of life forms, 
they further acknowledge a moral imperative to "... respect 
all human and nonhuman individuals in their own right as parts 
of the whole without feeling the need to set up hierarchies of 
species with humans at the top" (Sessions and Devall 1985; 
p. 68) . The language used here by deep ecologists clearly 
demonstrates that deep ecology's worldview closely resembles 
its vision of the ideal community. That is, it reflects the 
social arrangements of the minority tradition, with its 
emphasis on non-hierarchical, democratic communities, thus 
meeting another criterion for consideration as a religious 
paradigm.
Although, as discussed in previous chapters, the presence 
of religious ritual may not be as apparent in radical
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movements as the presence of religious or quasi-religious 
ideology, the need for ritual is elaborated upon by deep 
ecologists. "...the use of rituals and celebratory
expressions of place - painting, dancing, expressive writing, 
poetry - drawn from emotions and observations of persons who 
feel the rhythms of [a particular] place, are themselves 
direct action of the sort which further encourages ecological 
consciousness" (Sessions and Devall 1985; p.188). Along with 
other aspects of religious life, such rituals function as 
motivational forces to action, even if the actions (or entire 
lifestyles) in which one must engage are inconvenient or 
burdensome by the standards of mainstream Western culture. 
Furthermore, "...Religion would not be itself if it did not 
give some place to the free combinations of thought and 
activity, to play, to art, to all that recreates the spirit 
that has been fatigued by too great slavishness of daily work" 
(Durkheim 1915; p.426). The rituals and expressive activities 
described above answer to these recreative needs.
However, as expected, within the deep ecology movement, 
the primary emphasis is overwhelmingly on ideology. 
"Supporters of the deep ecology movement act in contemporary 
conflicts on the basis of their fundamental beliefs and 
attitudes. This gives them a particular strength and a joyful 
expectation of hope for a greener future" (Naess 1993; p.208). 
Naess asserts that the ecosophies offered by deep ecology are 
of the sort that can "...provide a motivating force for all
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the activities and movements aimed at saving the planet from 
human domination and exploitation" (Naess 19 93; p.184). As 
discussed in previous chapters, if ideologies are strong 
enough to influence individuals to participate in an 
alternative lifestyle so drastically different from mainstream 
lifestyles as that proposed by deep ecology, those ideologies 
may come to find religious or quasi-religious expression. 
This is likely to be the case since, "In all its forms, 
(religion's) object is to raise man above himself and to make 
him lead a life superior to that which he would lead, if he 
followed only his own individual whims ... the real function 
of religion is not to make us think, to enrich our knowledge 
. . . but rather, it is to make us act, to aid us to live" 
(Durkheim 1915; p. 461-463). Thus, deep ecology, insofar as 
it motivates people to behave toward the natural environment 
in ways consistent with the radical worldview it espouses, 
meets yet another criterion for definition as a religious or 
quasi-religious movement.
Finally, as mentioned in the previous chapter, religious 
ideology that emerges (or continues to exist) in present 
society has a relatively new and formidable rival - science 
(Durkheim 1915) . Any claim, religious or otherwise, about the 
organization of the universe must be accountable to this 
institution, which is often venerated as the source of "the 
final word" on the nature of things. Religion "...can affirm 
nothing it denies, deny nothing that it affirms, and establish
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nothing that is not directly or indirectly founded upon 
principles taken from it" (Durkheim 1915; p. 479). Deep 
ecology does not merely answer to science, it invokes it to 
support its claims. Specifically, deep ecologists support 
their principles through references to the science of ecology, 
and to a certain extent, modern physics (Sessions and Devall 
1985; p.89). According to Sessions and Devall, "The major 
contribution of the science of ecology to deep ecology has 
been the rediscovery within the modern scientific context that 
everything is connected to everything else. Thus, as a 
science, ecology provided a view of Nature that was lacking in 
the discreet, reductionist approach to Nature of the other 
sciences."
In summary, deep ecology is a radical environmental 
movement based on axioms that are religious in character. Not 
only is its religious character and association with other 
established religions openly acknowledged by the movement's 
founders, but it is readily discernible through analysis of 
the movement's literature. Therefore, a researcher concerned 
with the relationship between environmental beliefs and 
behaviors would be remiss in conducting survey research 
without asking respondents if they are affiliated with an 
environmental movement such as deep ecology. Since the 
ideologies and related imperatives asserted by deep ecologists 
are so entirely in reference to the relationship between 
humans and the natural environment, would not the presence or
87
absence of affiliation with deep ecology be a stronger 
determinant of environmental behaviors than the presence or 
absence of Judeo-Christian affiliation? Furthermore, since, 
according to Naess, Christianity and deep ecology are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, a respondent could be 
Christian, yet still view nature as sacred. In this case, the 
respondent's environmental behavior is informed by religious 
or quasi-religious ideology, though not necessarily through 
any Judeo-Christian affiliation that may be reported in a 
survey. In light if these possibilities, researchers must 
expand their definitions of "religious" to include those 
beliefs which, in previous research, probably could have been 
found among respondents who fell into that vague, overly-used 
"other" category (chapter 3) .
The religious content of deep ecology is both obvious and 
openly acknowledged by its adherents. In the following 
chapter, a movement will be introduced and described whose 
religious content is neither obvious nor acknowledged by its 
founder. It will be demonstrated, however, that not only are 
some of its concepts quasi-religious, but that the extreme 
radical nature of the movement is such that participation in 
the movement may have a profound affect on the relationship 
between religious beliefs and environmental behaviors among 
its adherents.
CHAPTER VI
SOCIAL ECOLOGY
In the previous chapter, we discussed an environmental 
movement whose proponents assert that in order to address 
environmental problems, humanity must begin by challenging the 
current, anthropocentric environmental paradigm and replacing 
it with a biocentric environmental paradigm that recognizes an 
egalitarian relationship between human and nonhuman nature. 
Although deep ecologists do give some attention to the need 
for communities organized according to the "minority 
tradition," their primary emphasis is not nearly as much on 
the structure of society as it is on the need for global 
acceptance of ecocentric religious axioms. In this chapter, 
we will be exploring social ecology, whose founder, Murray 
Bookchin, expresses vehement opposition to deep ecology and 
its preoccupation with what he refers to as "mysticism." For 
social ecologists, rather than looking to religion or 
philosophy for solutions to our environmental problems, we 
should be looking to society. "What literally defines social 
ecology as 'social' is its recognition of the often overlooked 
fact that nearly all our present ecological problems arise 
from deep-seated social problems. Conversely, present
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ecological problems cannot be clearly understood, much less 
resolved, without resolutely dealing with the problems within 
society" (Bookchin 1993; p.354).
The self-proclaimed founder of the social ecology 
movement, Murray Bookchin, "has long been a major figure in 
anarchist and utopian political theory, theory of technology, 
urbanism, and the philosophy of nature" (Zimmerman et al 1993; 
p. 3 54) . His anarchist voice is heard very clearly in his 
writings on social ecology, which, regardless of its primary 
emphasis on tangible, observable changes in social structure, 
arguably challenges the philosophical presuppositions of the 
dominant social paradigm on a far more radical and "deeper" 
level than does "deep" ecology itself, which quite regularly 
finds itself the object of Bookchin's merciless criticism. Of 
his many writings on social ecology, Bookchin states, "The 
Ecology of Freedom still remains the most comprehensive 
statement of my ideas and of social ecology generally ... My 
work's theoretical arch ... is reared by some nine books, 
among which The Ecology of Freedom is the keystone." 
Therefore, The Ecology of Freedom (1991), along with Post- 
Scarcity Anarchism (1971), Social Ecology Versus Deep Ecology
(1988) and What is Social Ecology (1993) , all written by
Bookchin, have been referenced for the ensuing analysis.
As stated above, social ecology emphasizes the need to 
address, first and foremost, social structure in order to 
address environmental problems. Specifically, social ecology
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calls for the dissolution of hierarchy4 and class domination 
in all of its forms, since, "... the hierarchical mentality 
and class relationships that so thoroughly permeate society 
give rise the very idea of dominating the natural world" 
(Bookchin 1993; p. 354). Nonhierarchical mentality, however, 
is not to be confused with the biocentrism espoused by deep 
ecology, which Bookchin describes as the "...'zoologization' 
of human beings and of society... Deep ecology reduces people 
from social beings to a simple species . . . (it) essentially 
ignores the social nature of humanity and the social origins 
of the ecological crisis" (Bookchin 1988; p. 18). Yet, like 
deep ecology, social ecology does not adhere to 
anthropocentric notions of the relationship between human and 
nonhuman nature either. It calls for an understanding of the 
human species as the culmination of the gradual processes of 
natural evolution, wherein humanity not only remains a part of 
nature, but has become nature rendered self-conscious. Human 
nature is viewed as neither above nor below nonhuman nature. 
However, its unique attributes and subsequently unique 
relationship to the natural environment are acknowledged.
" . . . (T)he human and nonhuman can be seen as aspects of an 
evolutionary continuum, and the emergence of the human can 
be located in the evolution of the nonhuman without advancing 
naive claims that one is either 'superior to' or 'made for' 
the other" (Bookchin 1993; p. 359).
Social ecology recognizes a wholeness within nature based
on what Bookchin refers to as a "unity in diversity". This 
emphasis on wholeness, Bookchin repeatedly cautions, is not to 
be confused with the "oneness" emphasized by deep ecologists 
in their explanations of self-realization through universal 
identification with all elements in nature. Bookchin warns,
"Such flippant abstractions of human individuality are 
extremely dangerous. Historically, a 'Self' that absorbs all 
real existential selves has been used from time immemorial to 
absorb individual uniqueness and freedom into a supreme 
'individual' who heads the state, churches of various sorts, 
adoring congregations, and spellbound constituencies" 
(Bookchin 1988; p.19). The concept of wholeness or "unity in 
diversity" in contrast, emphasizes recognition of the 
uniqueness of individuals, both human and nonhuman, as 
distinct parts of a harmoniously integrated whole.
Of the many characteristics that distinguish humans as 
unique from other species, the fact that humans form cultures, 
or "highly mutable societies" is essential to social ecology 
(Bookchin 1993; p. 358). The development of a species that 
forms societies is seen by Bookchin as a natural result of 
evolution, and therefore, instead of referring to biological 
nature and society as distinct realms, he refers to them as 
"first nature" and "second nature" respectively. He states:
"Human beings always remain rooted in their biological evolut 
'first nature,' but they produce a characteristically 
human social nature oftheir own, which we may call 
'second nature.' And far from being 'unnatural,' human
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second nature is eminently a creation of organic 
evolution's first nature. To write the second nature 
created by human beings out of nature as a whole, 
or indeed, to minimize it, is to ignore the 
creativity of natural evolution itself and to view 
it onesidedly" (Bookchin 1993;p.358).
Although humans are not unique among species in first (or 
biotic) nature insofar as they alter the natural surroundings 
in which they exist, "(s)econd [or human] nature is the way in 
which human beings as flexible, highly intelligent primates 
inhabit the natural world ... the environmental changes that
human beings produce are significantly different from those 
produced by nonhuman beings. Humans act upon their 
environments with considerable technical foresight, however 
lacking that foresight may be in ecological respects" 
(Bookchin 1993; p. 360) . Therefore, in order to understand or 
address the relationship between human and nonhuman nature, 
the relationships that exist within second nature, i.e. human 
cultures and societies, must be understood and addressed.
In keeping with this claim that there is a need to 
explore the development of second nature out of first, and 
specifically, the development of hierarchy within second 
nature, Bookchin (19 91) undergoes a very thorough and 
elaborate exploration of the emergence of hierarchy out of 
nonhierarchical, organic societies. The period of transition 
which he discusses spans several millennia, the details of 
which are far beyond the scope of this paper. Yet, in the
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course of his analysis, Bookchin gives quite considerable 
attention to religion, insofar as it was both affected by and 
supportive of the development of hierarchy, and how this 
development both determined and was determined, throughout its 
various stages, by the interaction between human nature and 
biotic nature. This aspect of social ecology's arguments will 
be given considerable attention in the following discussion.
As Bookchin points out, "The notion that man is destined 
to dominate nature is by no means a universal feature of human 
culture. If anything this notion is almost completely alien 
to the outlook of so-called primitive or preliterate 
communities" (Bookchin 1991; p.43). He further points out 
that people in preliterate societies did not see themselves in 
a relationship of dominance or subordination with nature, or 
even as distinct from nature. Rather, they experienced 
themselves as existing within nature (Bookchin 1991; p. 5) .
Since social ecology claims to have its foundations in the 
sensibilities of these peoples (Bookchin 1991; p. 47-48), an 
understanding of their relationship to the natural world, as 
interpreted by social ecologists, is essential to an 
understanding of social ecology.
For social ecologists, the notion of nature, as it was 
understood among preliterate peoples, is always social, 
insofar as all members of nonhuman nature are perceived and 
treated as members of the community in the same sense that all 
members of human nature are treated as such (Bookchin 1991; p.
94
47-49):
"Nature is not merely a habitat; it is a 
participant that advises the community with its 
omens, secures it with its camouflage, leaves it 
telltale messages in broken twigs and footprints, 
whispers warnings to it in the wind's voice, 
nourishes it with a largesse of plants and animals, 
and in its countless functions and counsels is 
absorbed into the community's nexus of rights and 
duties" (Bookchin 1991; p.47).
Rituals and ceremonies among preliterate peoples who adhere to 
such an understanding of nature did not serve any function of 
commanding natural elements or spirits, nor were they 
expressions of worship. Rather, "What the ecological 
ceremonial does ... is socialize the natural world and
complete the involvement of society with nature" (Bookchin 
1991; p.47).
Insofar as the communities of these peoples were 
nonhierarchical and cooperative, as opposed to hierarchical 
and competitive, the relationship between human and nonhuman 
nature was likewise seen as highly cooperative and 
characterized by "...an outlook toward life that visualized 
people, things, and relations in terms of their uniqueness 
rather than their 'superiority' or 'inferiority'" (Bookchin 
1991; p.44). This cooperative spirit was accompanied by a 
respect for the subjectivity of others, both human and 
nonhuman. For example, even with the practice of magic, the 
attempt to coerce nature or "supernature, " a concept which our
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hierarchical culture incorrectly imposes upon nonhierarchical 
culture in our interpretations of their world, was absent 
(Bookchin 1991; p.99). Rather, "Prior to the manipulative act 
is the ceremonious supplicatory word, the appeal to a rational 
being - to a subject - for cooperation and understanding.
Rites always precede action and signify that there must be 
communication between equal participants, not mere coercion" 
(Bookchin 1991; p.99).
For social ecologists, this understanding of the 
relationships within nature as egalitarian and cooperative was 
a projection by these preliterate peoples of their 
egalitarian, cooperative social structure onto the natural 
world (Bookchin 1991). Predictably, as social structures 
began to change, so did this view of nature. Gradually, as 
social life, through a variety of gradual developments, came 
to be characterized by hierarchy and eventually classes, so 
did human perceptions of the organization of the universe 
(Bookchin 1991). Meanwhile, the increase in systems of 
domination and subordination within social structures 
coincided with an anthropomorphism of deities, which 
reciprocally acted back upon social structure in a manner that 
helped to perpetuate and solidify hierarchical social 
arrangements (Bookchin 1991; p. 90-94).
Bookchin hypothesizes, however, that the anthropomorphism 
of deities was probably preceded by a transition within 
animism itself from viewing animals (or nonhumans) as
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individual animals to viewing them as general or universalized 
animal spirits. " . . . (G)eneralization in this form marks the 
first steps toward the objectification of the external world" 
(Bookchin 1991; p. 99-100). Using, as an example, the shift 
from viewing a bear as an individual bear with its own
subjectivity and autonomy, to viewing "bear" as a
universalized, spiritual concept, he explains:
"If the individual bear is merely an epiphenomenon 
of an animal, it is now possible to objectify 
nature by completely subsuming the particular by 
the general and denying the uniqueness of the 
specific and the concrete. The emphasis of the 
animistic outlook thereby shifts from accommodation 
and communication to domination and coercion" 
(Bookchin 1991; p. 100).
From this point, as social structure gradually becomes 
increasingly more hierarchical, the notion of animal spirits 
gradually transforms into one of increasingly anthropomorphic 
deities.
Meanwhile, as hierarchical societies crystallized into 
class societies, the "priestly corporation," gradually had
developed out of shamanism and eventually, "...acquired the
role of cosmic brokerage firm between humanity and its 
increasingly anthropomorphic deities - deities no longer to be 
confused with the nature spirits that peopled the environment 
of organic society." (Bookchin 1991; p.91). This transition
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from shamanism to priesthood was, in effect a transition from 
magic to theology, that is, a transition from explaining the 
world through experience within the world (or through nature), 
to explaining the world through "...rational accounts of the
origins, workings and destiny of the cosmos (emphasis added)" 
(Bookchin 1991; p.91). Furthermore, the notion of a deity or 
deities distinct from and holding power over the material 
world coincided with the notion of ruler(s) and ruled within 
the material world. As Bookchin explains:
"By converting mundane nature spirits and demons 
into humanlike supernatural deities and devils, the 
priestly corporation had cunningly created a 
radically new social and ideological dispensation - 
indeed, a new way of mentalizing rule. The 
guardian deity of the community increasingly became 
a surrogate for the community as a whole 
literally, a personification and materialization of 
a primal solidarity that gradually acquired the 
trappings of outright social sovereignty . . . our 
humanlike gods and goddesses were the projection 
... of the priestly corporation into an all too 
real pantheon of social domination and material 
exploitation" (Bookchin 1991; p. 93).
Because of their unique position as arbiters between the 
otherworldly deities and the material world, those of the 
priestly corporation came to be "... something quite new: a 
class," distinct from all other members of society and endowed
with privileges in accordance with membership in that class. 
(Bookchin 1991; p.93).
In addition to giving an elaborate account of the gradual
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transition from animism to belief in anthropomorphic deities, 
and the parallel transition from nonhierarchical to class 
society, Bookchin (1991) discusses the content of the Hebrew 
Bible, which, from his analysis, appears to be the ultimate 
representation of domination and hierarchy. For Bookchin, the 
Hebrew Bible is unique in that it establishes God's universal 
sovereignty in a self-derivative fashion. God is ruler over 
all simply because God deems it so. "No cosmogony, morality 
or rationality is necessary to explain it, and man's duty is 
to obey unquestioningly" (Bookchin 1991; p.104). Not only 
does the Hebrew Bible ordain that God is ruler over man, but 
likewise, that man is ruler over nature and again, simply 
because God wills it. (Bookchin 1991; p.104). Furthermore, 
"Yahweh's will" completed the separations between subject and 
object, mind and matter, spirit and reality (Bookchin 1991; p. 
105) .
"This religious separation of the world's order in 
terms of sovereignty rather than complementarity 
was to serve its acolytes well ... it provided an 
ideology of unreasoned obedience, of rule by fiat 
and the powers of supernatural retribution. And it 
achieved this sweeping transformation not by 
invoking nature and her deities . . . but by invoking 
a completely disembodied, abstract, and nameless 
Supernature that allowed for the codification of 
pure belief without the constraints of empirical 
reality" (Bookchin 1991; p.105).
According to Bookchin, the hierarchical character of the 
Hebrew Bible and the anthropomorphism of deities described
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above, in combination with other variables (e.g. the emergence 
of rationalism, the emergence of the city, the development of 
"authoritarian technics" and a market economy) firmly 
solidified social hierarchy and class domination.
It is clear from the overwhelming amount of space given to 
religion by Bookchin in The Ecology of Freedom that, although 
he does not see religion as the answer to current 
environmental problems, neither does he view it as 
inconsequential to such problems, insofar as environmental 
problems and religion are both directly related to the 
existence of hierarchy within society. Although religion 
ultimately reflects existing social structures (Bookchin 1991, 
p.100; Durkheim 1915), religion also acts back upon the very 
structure that it initially reflects (Bookchin 1991; p. 90). 
In reference to the transition from organic sensibility5 to 
hierarchical mentality and the need for a reversal of this 
transition, Bookchin states, "...What began as a sensibility 
evolved into concrete fact. Thus the effort to restore the 
ecological principle of unity in diversity has become a social 
effort in its own right - a revolutionary effort that must 
rearrange sensibility in order to rearrange the world" 
(Bookchin 1991; p. 7).
However, it cannot be stressed enough that Bookchin, 
regardless of his emphasis on the role of religion in the 
development of hierarchy and domination (Bookchin 1991) and 
his recognition of the need for "a sweeping change in existing
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spiritual values" (Bookchin 1993; p.355), asserts that social 
structure must be the initial locus of change if the 
relationship between human and biotic nature is to change. 
These changes in social structure must be accompanied by- 
changes in cultural "sensibilities" toward nature. Structural 
changes within society itself, however, are of primary 
importance, not only because it is second nature that
determines how humans inhabit first nature, but also because 
certain of our secular institutions are independent of and 
impervious to the influence of religion.
This particularly applies to capitalism, and its
grow-or-die imperative which renders any participant with an 
ecological conscience "...at a fatal disadvantage in a 
competitive relationship with a rival . . . who lacks any 
ecological concerns and thus produces at lower costs and reaps 
higher profits for further capital expansion" (Bookchin 1993; 
p.3 68). As Bookchin points out:
" [Industrial growth] stems above all from harshly 
objective factors churned up by the expansion of 
the market itself, factors that are largely 
impervious to moral considerations and efforts at 
ethical persuasion ... The point that social 
ecology emphasizes is not that moral and spiritual 
change is meaningless or unnecessary, but that 
modern capitalism is structurally amoral and hence 
impervious to any moral appeals" (Bookchin 1993;
p.367-368) .
Therefore, it is directly on social structure and secular 
institutions that we must focus our attention. Specifically,
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hierarchical social arrangements within these institutions 
must be abolished. But with what sort of social arrangements 
would they be replaced? Although he in no way suggests that 
we ignore the claims of modern science, abandon all forms of 
modern technology, and return to primitive lifeways, Bookchin 
does refer to preliterate, nonhierarchical, organic societies 
for some basic principles upon which a future, nonhierarchical 
society could be founded. Three basic principles to which he 
gives significant attention are the "law of the irreducible 
minimum," the principle of usufruct, and the custom of mutual 
aid (Bookchin 1991; Bookchin; 1993) .
The law of the irreducible minimum refers to "... the 
shared notion that all members of a community are entitled to 
a means of life, irrespective of the amount of work they 
perform. To deny anyone food, shelter, and the basic means of 
life because of infirmities or even frivolous behavior would 
have been seen as a heinous denial of the very right to live" 
(Bookchin 1993; p. 364) . Bookchin ties the law of the 
irreducible minimum into a distinction he makes between 
justice and freedom - justice being that which is striven for 
in our current societies, and freedom being that which is 
found in nonhierarchical societies.
Justice, according to social ecology, is based on a 
notion of equality which "rewards each according to his or her 
contribution to society and sees everyone as 'equal in the 
eyes of the law' and 'equal in opportunity'" (Bookchin 1991;
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p. 9) . Freedom, on the other hand, . .presupposes an 
equality based on recognition of inequality - the inequality 
of capacities and needs, of abilities and responsibilities" 
(Bookchin 1991; p.9). A society that is structured according 
to the law of the irreducible minimum, and therefore 
recognizes the inequalities of individuals as a result of each 
individual's unique capabilities and circumstances, is 
necessary for each individual to truly have the freedom to 
develop according to his or true creative capacity. A free 
society is one which acknowledges and respects such variety 
and diversity among humans and therefore respects variety and 
diversity within nonhuman nature as well (Bookchin 1991) .
The principle of usufruct, as it existed in organic 
societies, was "...the notion that means of life that were not 
being used by one group could be used, as need be, by another. 
Thus, unused land, orchards, and even tools and weapons, if 
left idle, were left at the disposition of anyone in the 
community who needed them." The principle of usufruct stands 
in contrast to the principle of private property. The notion 
of "property" itself was common in organic societies, both in 
an individualistic and communistic sense. However, the 
principle of usufruct was primary, meaning that resources were 
frequently allocated according to whomever was using them, and 
for as long as they were being used. "Function, in effect, 
replaces our hallowed concept of possession" with the emphasis 
not on proprietorship, but on use itself (Bookchin 1991; p.
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50) .
Related to the concept of usufruct was the practice of 
"mutual aid", which refers to a sharing of resources and labor 
among families. This cooperation between families provided 
assurance that, in times of hardship, a family could count on 
the assistance of others within the community (Bookchin 1993; 
p.3 64). Mutual aid, along with the principle of usufruct and 
the law of the irreducible minimum, were highly characteristic 
of nonhierarchical, organic societies and "...became so 
sedimented into society that they persisted long after 
hierarchy became oppressive and class society became 
predominant" (Bookchin 1993; p. 364-365). Gradually,
however, these principles weakened and came to be replaced by 
capitalism, "...a system of distribution based on exchange 
rather than complementarity and mutual aid" (Bookchin 1993; 
p.369) .
Social ecology calls, in part, for a return to a society 
based on principles such as those described above. In 
addition, one would find in these societies certain other 
characteristics which are discussed in detail by Bookchin 
throughout his writings. These characteristics include an 
ethics of complementarity6, a goal of wholeness through 
diversification, decentralized, confederally united 
communities, soft technologies, small scale agriculture and 
industry, recycling, production of high quality goods, shared 
property, and citizen participation in a direct democracy7
104
(Bookchin; 1971, 1991, 1993).
Note that social ecology does not advocate a complete 
return to a primitive lifestyle. Rather, the need for 
technology, agriculture and industry is acknowledged. There 
is no suggestion within social ecology that these aspects of 
our current societies are to be done away with entirely. 
Rather, social ecology insists that science and technology be 
modified both qualitatively and quantitatively to achieve ends 
in keeping with a nonhierarchical society based on sound 
ecological principles. "If we are to achieve an ecological 
society in the future, it will have to be enriched by the 
insights, knowledge, and data we have acquired as a result of 
the long history of philosophy, science, technology, and 
rationality - cleansed of magic, the worship of deities, and 
primeval religions" (Bookchin 1991; p. lvii) . Which, finally,
brings us to the question that is most central to the present 
analysis: Does adherence to social ecology's principles
require acceptance of or rejection of any particular religious 
paradigm?
At first glance, when reading literature from the social 
ecology movement, one is inclined to assume that religious 
affiliation is irrelevant, given the movement's attention to 
secular institutions and disdain for environmental movements 
whose primary emphases are on religion or spirituality. For 
social ecologists, "To prioritize any form of spirituality 
over social factors that actually erode all forms of
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spirituality, raises serious questions about one's ability to 
come to grips with reality" (Bookchin 1993; p.355). However, 
as stated above, social ecology does not view spirituality as 
altogether irrelevant. "...It [social ecology] was, in fact, 
among the earliest of contemporary ecologies to call for a 
sweeping change in existing spiritual values" - a change 
toward a "truly natural spirituality" (Bookchin 1993; p.355).
The difference between the spirituality of social ecology and 
that of the "mystical" ecology movements (Bookchin 1991) such 
as deep ecology, is that:
"It does not fall back on incantations, sutras, 
flow diagrams or spiritual vagaries. It is 
avowedly rational. It does not try to regale 
metaphorical forms of spiritual mechanism and crude 
biologism with Taoist, Buddhist, Christian, or 
shamanistic eco-babble. It is a coherent form of 
naturalism that looks to evolution and the 
biosphere, not to deities in the sky or under the 
earth for quasi-religious and supernaturalistic 
explanations of natural and social phenomena" 
(Bookchin 1988; p. 26).
As mentioned in a previous endnote (#6), when Bookchin 
discusses "religion," he is referring to a belief in 
otherworldly deities or a belief in the supernatural. It is 
this specific characteristic of religion that Bookchin finds 
offensive insofar as he views "...supernature with its
shamans, priests, priestesses, and fanciful deities ... (as) 
merely anthropomorphic extensions and distortions of the 
'Human1 as all-embracing divinities" (Bookchin 1988; p.27).
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Since, for Bookchin, such beliefs are characteristic 
specifically of hierarchical societies, religion, so defined, 
would only be found in those societies which are structured 
hierarchically. The animism of the nonhierarchical societies 
which he discusses, insofar as it is not characterized by a 
belief in otherworldly beings or in supernatural entities, is 
not, for Bookchin, a religion. Rather, he uses the term 
"sensibilities" when referring to these all-encompassing 
beliefs about the relationships among all humans and nonhumans 
in the natural world. These "sensibilities" however, qualify 
as religious according to the definitions used for this 
project (chapter 1), since according to Durkheim's The 
Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915), although 
beliefs in otherworldly deities may be common to religion, 
they are yet not necessary for a system of beliefs to be 
defined as religious.
As stated above, the sensibilities of preliterate peoples 
to which Bookchin refers pertain to the perceived 
relationships among all members, both human and nonhuman, of 
a shared community. All individual elements in nature are 
viewed as active, unique participants, comprising a complex 
whole characterized by diversity and cooperation (Bookchin 
1991). And, perhaps most important to social ecology, every 
element in the natural world is recognized for its 
subjectivity. Bookchin states, "We slander the natural world 
when we deny its activity, striving, creativity, and
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development as well as its subjectivity" (Bookchin 1991; 
p.313). Furthermore, through recognizing the subjectivity of 
the nonhuman natural world, the human natural world has much 
to learn and gain. "Today we are faced with the possibility 
of permitting nature ... to open itself to us ethically on its 
own terms" (Bookchin 1991; p.364) .
This is not to say that social ecology views nature or 
any of its participants as sacred, for subjectivity and 
sacredness are not the same thing. However, for Durkheim, it 
is not only objects that can be sacred. Ideas or principles 
such as those of Buddhism (as explained in chapter one) can 
also hold sacred status in a community, particularly if they 
are considered inviolable by humans. For social ecology, the 
principles taught to us by nature, "on its own terms, " are
arguably sacred according to Durkheimian theory.
First of all, social ecology sees nature as imbued with 
reason. By reason, Bookchin is not referring to "...what we 
commonly regard as reason (Bookchin 1991; p. 270). That is,
"...merely a technique for advancing personal opinions and 
interest ... an instrument to efficiently achieve our
individual ends" (Bookchin 1991; p. 270). Rather, when 
Bookchin refers to reason, he is referring to a process which:
"... involves high ideals, binding values, and 
lofty goals for humanity as a whole that derive 
from supraindividual, almost transcendental, canons 
of right and wrong, of virtue and evil. Reason, in
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this sense, is not a matter of personal opinion or 
taste. It seems to inhere to objective reality 
itself - in a sturdy belief in a rational and 
meaningful universe that is independent of our 
needs and proclivities as individuals. This mode 
of reason ... expresses the logos of the world and 
retains its integrity and validity apart from the 
interplay of human volitions and interests" 
(Bookchin 1991; p. 270).
For Bookchin, this form of reason is inherent in nature. He 
devotes most of the epilogue of The Ecology of Freedom to the 
claims of modern science in such disciplines as physics and 
biology and emphasizes the increased evidence that strongly 
suggests that there exists a self-evolving, creative, and
teleological striving within the physical universe. He makes
/
the claim of these modern scientific concepts that, "... all 
these concepts taken together are ways of understanding nature 
as such, not mere mystical vagaries. They are supported more 
by evidence than are the theoretical prejudices that still 
exist today against a universe charged with meaning, dare I 
say, with ethical meaning" (Bookchin 1991; p. 357).
However, it is not the ethical character of the universal 
principles revealed to us by nature that makes them sacred 
(although their ethical quality does add support to the notion 
that they are religious principles) . Rather, it is social 
ecology's claim that, as quoted above, they retain their, 
"integrity and validity apart from the interplay of human 
volition and interests" (Bookchin 1991; p. 270) . Bookchin 
makes the claim that social ecology's principles are derived
109
from the reason that is revealed to us through nature and that 
they are not accountable to the whims of humanity. Perhaps 
the following passage best illustrates the fact that the 
relationship between these principles and human manipulation 
is akin to the relationship between the sacred and the 
profane:
"Mutualism, self-organization, freedom, and 
subjectivity, cohered by social ecology's 
principles of unity in diversity, spontaneity, and 
non-hierarchical relationships, are thus ends in 
themselves ... Nature does not 'exist' for us to 
use; it simply legitimates us and our uniqueness 
ecologically. Like the concept of 'being,' these 
principles of social ecology require no 
explanation, merely verification. They are
elements of an ethical ontology, not rules of the 
game that can be changed to suit one' s personal 
needs" (Bookchin 1991; p. 346).
Furthermore, regardless of whether or not the 
"sensibilities" of preliterate societies fit the description 
of religion employed by Durkheim, or by any theorist for that 
matter, Bookchin himself, on many occasions, describes them as 
spiritual. Furthermore, he does advocate incorporation of some 
of the spiritual beliefs and activities of preliterate peoples 
into current and future societies. He states:
"The creatively reproductive form we wish to impart 
to a new ecological community requires the 
mediation of a libertarian reason, one that bears 
witness to the symbiotic animism of preliterate 
sensibilities without becoming captive to its myths 
and self-deceptions. Even though animals have not
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been persuaded by rituals and ceremonials to seek 
out the hunter, we would do well to respect the 
animals and plants we consume by using an 
etiquette, perhaps even ceremonies, that 
acknowledge their integrity and subjectivity as 
living beings. For here nature has offered up a 
sacrifice to us that demands some kind of 
recompense in turn - even an aesthetic one. Nor 
are we alone the participants and audience for that 
ceremonial; life surrounds us everywhere and, in 
its own way, bears witness to ours. Our habitat, 
in effect, is not merely a place in which we happen 
to live; it is also a form of natural conscience 
(Bookchin 1991; p. 303).
What remains important, he stresses, is that these 
spiritual beliefs do not conflict with what we have come to 
know through philosophy and science. Bookchin states, 
"...perhaps we can achieve a way of thinking and experiencing 
that involves a quasi-animistic respiritualization of 
phenomena - inanimate as well as animate - without abandoning 
the insights provided by science and analytical reasoning" 
(Bookchin 1991; p.13). He repeatedly cautions us though, that 
this "...appeal for the 'respiritualization of the natural 
world' ...should not be mistaken for a theology that raises a 
deity above the natural world or that seeks to discover one 
within it. The spirituality advanced by social ecology is 
definitively naturalistic, rather than supernaturalistic or 
pantheistic" (Bookchin 1993; p.355).
Hence the spirituality of social ecology stands in stark 
contradiction to Judeo-Christian spirituality. If a member of 
the social ecology movement was given a survey which asked 
about his or her religious affiliation, he would fall into
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that "other" category described in previous chapters, not only 
because his or her beliefs would require rejection of beliefs 
in Judeo-Christian deities, but also because there currently 
is no formal religious denomination that specifically 
advocates the spiritual views of social ecology. The 
respondent may very well simply reply, "no religion" or 
"other," even though adherence to social ecology does imply 
adherence to a particular worldview, some aspects of which are 
religious or spiritual. In addition, social ecology advances 
many principles which, even if not religious, arguably have 
quasi-religious undertones.
As discussed above, the perception that reason is an 
immanent feature of reality is an example of such a religious 
or quasi-religious principle. According to Bookchin, reason 
is "... an inherent force . . . that impart (s) meaning and 
coherence to reality at all levels of existence . . . reason 
exists in nature as the self-organizing attributes of 
substance; it is latent subjectivity in the inorganic and 
organic levels of reality that reveal an inherent striving 
toward consciousness" (Bookchin 1991; p.10). Reason and an 
inherent striving toward consciousness, as described here by 
Bookchin, can be likened to that "vague power spread through 
all things" to which religious beliefs are often addressed 
(Durkheim 1915; p.228).
The ethics of complementarity and wholeness discussed 
above would also fall into this category of quasi-religious
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belief, especially in its ethical imperative to act in 
accordance with the need for "unity in diversity." That is, 
humans are expected to play a conscious role in protecting and 
fostering diversity among nonhuman species as well as within 
humanity in order to attain "unity in diversity" within 
society (Bookchin 1991; Bookchin 1993).
Social ecologists also state that, "Christianity's vision 
of a universal humanitas, for all the defects of the Church,
must always be a guiding principle, albeit without any notion 
of a Supernature to support it" (Bookchin 1991; p.liii). 
Again, it is not spirituality, but otherworldliness to which
social ecology is opposed. On the contrary, Bookchin 
acknowledges that a change in "sensibilities" is necessary to 
bring about the secular, structural, and institutional changes 
advocated by social ecology. He states, "What we crucially 
lack is the consciousness and sensibility that will help us 
achieve such eminently desirable goals . . . Our definitions 
must include not only the ability to reason logically and 
respond emotionally in a humanistic fashion; they must also 
include a fresh awareness of the relatedness between things 
and an imaginative insight into the possible" (Bookchin 1991; 
p. 19-20) . Bookchin suggests that the "ethical philosophy" 
which informs our future societies be the result of an effort 
"(t)o evoke nature as a source for objectively grounded 
ethics" (Bookchin 1991; p. 274) and that, "An ecological 
nature - and the objective ethics following from it - can
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spring to life, as it were, only in a society whose 
sensibilities and interrelationships have become ecological to 
their very core" (Durkheim 1991; p; 2 76).
In summary, although the primary emphasis of social 
ecology is on the need to abolish hierarchy within society, 
and to do this through addressing secular social institutions, 
especially capitalism, it also advocates the rejection of 
religious beliefs that reflect or support hierarchical social 
arrangements. This would include many of the beliefs common 
to Judeo-Christianity. Furthermore, social ecologists
advocate replacing these religious ideologies with 
"sensibilities," many of them spiritual, similar to those 
found in the nonhierarchical cultures of preliterate peoples.
The sensibilities of people within these cultures were such 
that all of nature's inhabitants, both human and nonhuman, 
were viewed in egalitarian terms, as diverse, complementary 
elements, each contributing to an organic, whole community. 
Such sensibilities, according to social ecology, should guide 
interactions not only among humans, but between human and 
biotic nature as well. Furthermore, many of these
sensibilities, in addition to some others put forth by social 
ecology, are afforded a status that could properly be defined 
as sacred, since they are viewed as being derived from reason 
which is inherent in the universe and not subject to human 
acceptance, denial, or manipulation. The universal truths 
revealed to us by nature, once understood, are not open to
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debate, nor are they to be applied in an arbitrary fashion. 
The profane world created through "second nature" (i.e. the 
social world) , is to be structured according to these 
sensibilities as they are revealed through "first nature" and 
the evolutionary process, a process whose ultimate truths 
remain intact regardless of human intervention.
Therefore, the fact that an adherent to social ecology 
would fall into the "other" category in survey research 
exploring the relationship between religion and 
environmentalism would not suggest that the respondent's 
environmental behaviors are not related to her religious or 
spiritual beliefs. Rather, it suggests that spiritual beliefs 
held by social ecologists are simply not represented in 
research that relies exclusively on traditional definitions of 
religion as defined from the perspective of mainstream Western 
culture. This much, social ecology and deep ecology have in 
common. That is, by virtue of the fact that they are radical 
environmental movements, and therefore advocate alternative 
lifestyles, the environmental behaviors of their followers are 
likely to be related to the religious or spiritual beliefs 
that characterize each movement, even if their ideologies are 
likely to go unnoticed in research that is not sensitive to 
definitions of religion or spirituality that reside outside of 
the mainstream. Whether or not the relationship between 
religious or quasi-religious belief and environmental behavior 
would be as strong for members of reformist organizations will
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be explored in the next chapter.
CHAPTER VII
TWO REFORMIST MOVEMENTS
The reformist organizations chosen for this analysis were 
Friends of the Earth and the National Wildlife Federation. 
Both are listed among "The Big Ten" of environmental 
organizations (Merchant 1992; p. 159-160) and both address 
environmental problems through working within the current 
political and institutional framework of our society. The 
literature examined from Friends of the Earth included a cover 
letter and brochure sent by the organization upon request for 
information regarding its philosophies and objectives, and a 
book titled Progress As If Survival Mattered by Friends of the 
Earth. Literature describing philosophies and objectives of 
the National Wildlife Federation was requested but never 
received. However, the organization publishes a bimonthly 
magazine. Articles from this magazine for the years 1994-96 
were used for this analysis.
Friends of the Earth
Perhaps the attitude of Friends of the Earth (FOE) toward 
the natural environment is best demonstrated by the
116
117
organization's suggestion that we, "...recognize relatively 
undisturbed ecosystems for what they are -- precious 
resources" (Ehrlich and Holdren 1981; p.16). Although 
Progress As If Survival Mattered, a book published by FOE 
describing the organization's philosophies and objectives, is 
self-contradictory on many points, it is unwaveringly 
consistent in its anthropocentric claims that all of nature 
exists as a resource for human consumption. Throughout this 
publicaTion, goals are described exclusively in terms of 
satisfaction of human needs and never in terms of the needs of 
nature for nature's sake. Nature is to be conserved not 
because of any perceived intrinsic value or right to 
existence, but because it is a resource for humans, and its 
depletion would cause hardships for humanity. Humans, not 
nature as a whole, are clearly the primary concern of Friends 
of the Earth, as is suggested by the cover letter sent with 
their literature which explained that FOE's programs focus 
primarily on "how environmental policies affect people." It 
appears then, for Friends of the Earth, that nature clearly 
exists within the realm of the profane.
It is also clear from their fundraising/membership 
literature that FOE addresses environmental issues not only 
through focusing attention on the economy, but for the sake of
the economy. As their literature explains, in reference to 
addressing environmental problems in the upcoming years, "This 
challenge will require a new brand of environmentalism - one
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that can link American concern for the economy with concern 
for the environment and public health ... We are reaching out 
to diverse partners, taking risks and investing in 
high-leverage programs that promote a healthy environment for 
a healthy economy." This emphasis on the American economy is 
also prevalent throughout Progress As If Survival Mattered, 
wherein environmental issues are typically discussed in terms 
of their effects on the economy and industry, with little 
discussion of the effects of resource consumption on nonhuman 
inhabitants of the natural environment.
For example, the chapter discussing the use of resources 
begins with a warning that, "Desperately trying to save 
ourselves by accelerating efforts to get the last usable chunk 
of ore out of the ground, the last barrel of oil, would merely 
hasten the decline of our extractive industries" (Nash 1981; 
p.151). Instead of discussing the destructive capabilities of 
our extractive technologies and whether or not they should be 
used in the first place, as we would expect of White, Bookchin 
or Naess, FOE points out that the problems with our most 
successful extractive technologies is that they are 
"economically unfeasible ... The profit is marginal. To 
develop technologies to process greater quantities [of 
resources] might require capital investments that even 
governments could not afford" (Van Deventer 1981; p. 152) . 
One of their main concerns regarding depletion or excessive 
extraction of nonrenewable resources within our own national
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boundaries is that it results in increased reliance on 
resources located in foreign countries which, again, is 
unfavorable to the American economy (Van Deventer 1981; 
p.152). Alleviation of such problems is often presented in 
terms of economic reform, with an accompanying faith that with 
the correct adjustments, usually in the form of tax incentives 
or disincentives, "the market" will ensure that resource 
extraction, development, and consumption will be modified so 
as to affect American economy and industry in a way that is 
compatible with a sustainable future.
Another theme that is consistent throughout Progress As 
If Survival Mattered is that of the need for protection of 
private property and an increase in ownership of natural 
resources. In the chapter on economic growth, it is suggested 
that, up until present, there has not been sufficient emphasis 
in U.S. economic policy on private ownership of resources, 
which has resulted in a large scale "tragedy of the commons" 
(Luten 1981; p.270-271) . FOE'S solution to this problem calls 
for extensive increased ownership of natural resources, 
although not always private ownership. FOE equally advocates 
ownership of resources, including water, minerals, forests, 
etc., by the U.S. government and by the United Nations, with 
the expectation that these entities, through legal ownership, 
could regulate the consumption of the world's declining 
natural resources through legal and economic measures (Nash, 
ed. 1981). The degree to which FOE appears at ease with the
120
concept of ownership of natural resources again demonstrates 
that nature, for FOE is by no means sacred. Their views stand 
in stark contrast to those of groups of people such as radical 
ecologists or Native Americans, who often do view the earth 
and its habitants as sacred or at least as imbued with 
subjectivity and self-organizational capacity. For these 
people, the idea that one can own elements in nature is almost
absurd. For FOE, ownership of nature is no less acceptable 
than ownership of any other object that exists within the 
profane world.
Along with private and government ownership, another 
predominant characteristic of FOE literature is emphasis on 
government regulation. Writers for FOE express confidence 
that government, the U.S. government in particular, has the 
appropriate capabilities and structure to address 
environmental, or actually "resource," problems. Neither the 
specific form and structure of American government nor the 
concepts of hierarchy and authority are challenged. FOE's 
suggestions for addressing resource issues are neither radical 
nor confrontational and usually amount to providing increased 
information to and applying increased political pressure on 
"decision makers" so that they can make more informed 
decisions. It is asserted that, "Refining the government's 
ability to make long-term, integrated projections of global 
trends should now be a top priority, along with establishing 
policy and directions to address specifically the problems of
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population, resources, and the environment" (Ehrlich et al. 
1981; p.15). In order to facilitate this refinement of the 
government's ability to make wise decisions, FOE suggests that 
the government develop stronger relationships with 
environment-related agencies, that educational retreats be 
planned for "decision-makers" inside and outside of 
government, that public education be increased, and that world 
conferences continue to be held to address environment-related 
issues (Ehrlich et al. 1981; p.15).
Not only does FOE support or appear to have strong faith 
in American government, but they appear equally in favor of 
its influence being felt on a global level. According to FOE, 
"War is the ultimate destroyer" (Nash 1981; p.243) and is one 
of the most significant causes of environmental destruction, 
both in terms of its preparations and actual occurrences. 
Furthermore, the threat of war exists because, "...among 
nations, anarchy reigns supreme" and "the cure for anarchy at 
the world level is government at the world level" (Nash 1981; 
p. 24 3-246) . According to Hugh Nash, who is the editor of 
Progress As If Survival Mattered, and who wrote the book's 
chapter on War and Preparedness, recognition of national 
sovereignty is equal to anarchy since it implies that states 
are under no obligation to recognize any authority higher than 
their own. For Nash, in such an anarchical world, war is 
inevitable and therefore, "We can have absolute national 
sovereignty without world peace. Or we can have world peace
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without national sovereignty. We cannot have both; the two 
are fundamentally irreconcilable. If peace is our sincere 
desire, we cannot rationally defend the 'sovereign equality of 
nations'" (Nash 1981; p.246). It is therefore suggested by 
FOE that the United Nations be strengthened, not merely as a 
league or confederation, but as a government with recognized 
authority to enforce its laws internationally, which, 
according to FOE, should result in increased feelings of 
security and safety from threats of attack throughout the 
world, therefore making disarmament possible (Nash 1981). The 
position of superiority to be occupied by the U.S. in this 
strengthened world government is clear. FOE states, in regard 
to their suggestions for bringing about this "New World 
Without Foreigners," "We cannot start by asking what other 
nations would agree to. The first thing to ask is what we of 
the U.S.A. would agree to" (Blake 1981; p.364).
So far, in our analysis of Friends of the Earth, it 
appears that we are a long way from Arne Naess's recognition 
of equal intrinsic worth among species or Murray Bookchin's 
utopian vision of a world without hierarchy and domination. 
There is no mention of the sacredness or subjectivity of 
nature. We are presented instead with an organization that 
views nature in profane terms, that is, as "precious 
resources" for human consumption, that not only approves of 
hierarchy but advocates obedience to as high an authority as 
possible (in this case the UN), and that ultimately believes
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that environmental problems can be addressed without 
completely abandoning capitalism and notions of progress and 
development. However, it would be inaccurate to claim that 
FOE is entirely in favor of the status-quo. Although the 
organization does not call for any truly radical changes in 
social structure or paradigms, it does call for government and 
economic reforms. And, in some areas of their publication, 
FOE does present excerpts of writings from various radical 
thinkers, including Murray Bookchin. However, the truly 
radical ideas of these writers, when presented at all, are 
presented only briefly and in sections at the ends of each
chapter titled "More Thoughts on [topic of chapter]," which
compile various excerpts of writings on each topic without 
further elaboration on each writer's visions or suggestions. 
Attention to religious sentiment or spirituality is almost 
entirely absent. Furthermore, even though some rather
challenging ideas are represented in the bodies of some 
chapters, ultimately, the solutions or plans of action
suggested by FOE always involve working within the system to 
bring about change. Proposed solutions do not require any 
radical changes in social structure or in the way the world is 
viewed with regard to the relationship between human and 
nonhuman nature.
For example, FOE insists that economic growth must 
decrease and that our economy must change from being a 
growth-oriented economy to a steady-state economy. They are
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very consistent with the assertion that, "Somehow the concept 
of a sustainable world must take root, replacing the passion 
for growth that has dominated the industrial age." However,
it is also consistently clear throughout Progress As If
Survival Mattered that passion for growth is questioned only 
insofar as it has brought us to a point of crisis. The 
concept of growth itself is not seriously challenged and is 
even considered as a possible option for the future, 
regardless of any decrease in growth that must occur in the 
present. FOE states that, if limits to growth are established 
now, "If growth and expansion later prove to be both possible 
and desirable, it would appear absurdly easy to set the
process in motion again. The resources would still be here" 
(Luten 1981; p.266).
There is some attempt by FOE to explain the roots of our 
environmental problems, but the attempts usually do not even 
approach the questioning of fundamental premises that is found 
in radical environmental movements. For example, when 
explaining the "...main source of our problems with natural 
resources," they state:
"When our country was young, we deemed it
advantageous to encourage the exploitation of 
resources. We were even anxious to give away 
public land to be used for private purposes, 
believing those uses would benefit the whole 
country . . . Now that we have built ourselves a 
culture and a country, we are slow to take back the 
concessions granted to resource-exploitative 
industries, even though the concessions 
harm us now" (Van Deventer 1981; p.154).
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Thus, it appears that for FOE, the exploitation of nature, in 
and of itself, is not a particularly controversial issue. The 
"right" to exploit nature is not challenged, since nature is 
seen strictly in terms of resources. Since nature exists 
within the realm of the profane, the extent to which resources 
have been exploited is problematic only because it has caused 
problems for the economy, industry and for humanity in
general. If this were not the case, and if in the future,
increased exploitation of resources is again desirable for the 
satisfaction of human needs, such exploitation would be an 
option.
As stated above, scattered throughout Progress As If 
Survival Mattered are various writings that challenge the 
status quo on a deeper level, such as an interview with Jose 
A. Lutzenberger. When asked with regard to economics, how to 
"arrive at a sustainable homeostatic society," Lutzenberger 
answers, "First, we must arrest the process of desacralization 
of Nature and the exclusion from our code of ethics of all 
concern for anything related to or useful to man. We must 
adopt (a) fundamental ethical principle of reverence for Life 
in all its forms and all its manifestations" (Lutzenberger 
1981; p. 415). However, although such deep ecological
principles as these are briefly represented, they are not 
detectable in the solutions to resource problems that are 
suggested by FOE and they are entirely absent in literature
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sent to prospective members of FOE. Instead, proposed 
solutions to excessive economic growth include such statements 
as, "When your mayor tells you that growth broadens the tax 
base, laugh in his face and ask him to count for you the 
growing cities with growing tax bases" (the recommendation 
really does not get more specific than this) or "Vote down 
bond issues" or ". ..abandon the growth mystique" by "producing 
planners who do not themselves believe in growth" (Luten 1981; 
p.275). The point here is not to debate the effectiveness of 
these solutions, but to point out that they do not require any 
fundamental challenge to our social institutions or 
fundamental religious or spiritual values, especially not to 
the point where FOE members are encouraged to lead lifestyles
radically different from those of mainstream culture.
Another example of FOE's affinity for radical ideas with 
reformist solutions can be found with regard to the issue of 
decentralization. FOE does devote an entire chapter of 
Progress As If Survival Mattered to the need for
decentralization of communities, the economy, and government 
in order to address resource problems. They even go so far as 
to advocate "true alternative lifestyles" within decentralized 
communities, although they do not explain exactly what they 
mean by that. However, it is clear that the decentralization 
to which FOE refers is different in many ways from that
advocated by deep and radical ecologists.
First, it is hierarchical, as is evidenced by FOE's claim
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that international anarchy must be replaced by an 
international government. FOE's call for decentralization 
does not at all imply that systems of domination and authority 
are at the root of environmental problems., On the contrary, 
it is anarchy which is seen as the biggest threat to the 
environment and therefore to humanity (Nash 1981; p.243-251). 
Furthermore, "the system" is not the primary place to look for 
solutions. FOE states, "We need to be concerned less with 
what the system does to us and concerned more with ways we can 
restructure our lives as individuals within local communities" 
(Denman and Denman 1981; p. 171).
Second, deep ecology and social ecology advocate 
communistic ownership of property within decentralized 
communities. For FOE, the right to private ownership must be 
protected. They explain, "In America, the problem is not only 
to get land into the hands of individuals who will use it 
productively in a community context, but also to get it out of 
the hands of monopolies ... without destroying the economic 
structure that will make individual land ownership possible" 
(Denman and Denman 1981; p. 174) .
Third, deep ecologists and social ecologists acknowledge 
both human and nonhuman members of the natural world as 
members of the community. They recognize the nonhuman world 
as an active force within the human world and vice-versa. 
This is demonstrated especially in social ecology's emphasis 
on the use of technologies that are tailored to the specific
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ecosystems of decentralized communities (Bookchin 1971; 1991) . 
FOE merely suggests that, "The decentralization process must 
take account of the need to bring technology into harmony with 
people" (Denman and Denman 1981; p.175). For the radical 
ecologist, technology must be brought into harmony with 
nature.
FOE does challenge mainstream American culture insofar as 
it points to "rampant consumerism in wealthy nations" as a 
"major cause of resource shortages" (Nash 1981; p. 245). It 
further insists that the lifestyle of the American family must 
change and parents much teach their children to have "very 
different expectations about a good life" (Mead 1981; p. 167). 
However, this statement is not followed by any description of 
what those expectations are that need changing nor how they 
should be changed. They simply state that me must educate 
ourselves as well as possible about environmental issues so 
that we "can intelligently judge national policy and act 
wisely in making local decisions" (Mead 1981; p. 167).
The rampant consumerism alluded to above is not discussed 
to any great length in terms of its relation to capitalism. 
However, it is briefly addressed in an article by Jerry Mander 
in which he discusses the control of the corporate world over 
television and advertising (Mander 1981; p.372-380). Although 
this excerpt from Mander does rather scathingly point to "the 
capitalist" as a major culprit in the production of 
environmental problems because of the degree to which he
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encourages consumerism, the end of the article leaves the 
reader with the feeling that nothing can be done about 
corporate control over advertising and media anyway, so why do 
anything? After advocating many positive changes in 
television, Mander nihilistically states, "All of these 
changes in television would be to the good, in my opinion, and 
worthy of support, but do you believe that they'd be any 
easier to achieve than the outright elimination of the whole 
technology? I don't think so." Following this article, there 
are no recommendations by FOE for addressing the issue of 
corporate control over television advertising and programming. 
This seems ironic considering the organization's emphasis in 
other chapters of Progress As If Survival Mattered on the need 
to eradicate monopolies and control of resources by large 
corporations.
Once again, the point is that FOE does include some 
alternative and sometimes radical viewpoints in their 
literature, but they do not espouse radical measures or 
lifestyles for addressing environmental problems. Even a
section of their book titled "A Utopian Vision" focuses 
predominantly on the types of products we would consume and 
the types of industries that would "flourish" in a future 
"utopian" society in comparison to the products and industries 
that characterize our culture currently. There is no 
discussion in this section of the relationship between 
humanity and nature, of a shift from viewing nature as profane
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to viewing it as sacred, nor any explanations of such concepts 
as freedom, wholeness, unity in diversity, egalitarian 
relationships, or the like. There is no encouragement for 
members to seek a new (or old for that matter) spiritual 
awareness or understanding of the universe. We are not told 
to question authority or even to question the notion of 
"progress" (as is evidenced by the title of the book).
Instead, FOE encourages us to keep informed, to vote, 
work within the legal system for environmental justice, to put 
pressure on political leaders, to get involved in local 
decision making processes, and to buy their T-shirts at a 
discounted price when purchasing a membership. Would 
participation in any of these activities require adherence to 
particular religious or spiritual beliefs? Probably not. 
Could an individual be a member of Friends of the Earth and 
simultaneously believe in the Biblical notion of stewardship 
or man's inherent right to dominate nature? Definitely. 
Would it be necessary to hold such beliefs in order to be a 
member of Friends of the Earth? No. Does FOE recommend 
changes in lifestyle that are so far removed from mainstream 
American culture that religious or spiritual beliefs may be 
necessary to help one maintain such a lifestyle? No. It 
follows, then, that any relationship between religious belief 
and membership in Friends of the Earth would be fortuitous 
rather than integral.
National Wildlife Federation
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The mission statement of the National Wildlife Federation 
(NWF) reads as follows: "To educate, inspire and assist
individuals and organizations of diverse cultures to conserve 
wildlife and other natural resources while protecting the 
Earth's environment to promote a peaceful, equitable, and 
sustainable future" (NWF 1996; p.2). National Wildlife, the
magazine published by NWF, is filled with articles that are in 
keeping both with what this mission statement says and with 
what it doesn't say. The articles provide evidence that the 
organization is undoubtedly in favor of conservation of 
species and ecosystems, but is also in favor of protecting 
local, state, and national economies. According to the 
mission statement above, wildlife is viewed as a natural 
resource. However, the articles in the magazine which argue 
for conservation are very ambiguous with regard to whether 
conservation is necessary for the sake of humans or for the 
sake of the species and ecosystems that are being conserved.
The debate over conservation of ecosystems v. use of 
resources for the sake of local economies has been well 
represented in National Wildlife for the last three years, as
is evidenced by the presence of articles about land use 
debates in the Western part of the U.S. in the majority of 
issues. In an article titled, "The Case of the Wandering 
Bull," which was about the reintroduction of caribou into U.S.
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Forest Service land, the author points out that the 
reintroduction of the caribou, for many, means "...a loss of 
logging jobs in favor of protection for the creature's old 
growth habitat." She further states that the crisis is 
similar to every other recent land-use crisis in the west in 
that "...this crisis is about conservation of an ancient 
ecosystem . . . (and) has triggered nasty rhetoric, business 
boycotts and even threats of violence in a community long 
dependent on surrounding natural resources" (Speart 1994; 
p. 14) . What is interesting about the presentation of this 
debate, and all of the other western land use debates
presented in National Wildlife, is that, although NWF states
that their position on the issue is in favor of conservation, 
they equally and neutrally present both sides of the issue. 
Furthermore, they never go into an explanation as to why NWF
is in favor of conservation over local economic concerns. Is 
it because it would be better for the economy in the long-run?
Is it because it would be better for humans in general in the
long-run? Is it because we need to conserve these natural 
resources so that they will be available for future 
consumption? Or, is it because we have a responsibility to 
protect the caribou's habitat because the caribou has
intrinsic worth equal to that of humans and therefore must be 
protected? We don't know. All that we do know is that NWF is 
in favor of "conservation."
A similar example is found in an article titled, "Apathy?
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Not Around Here!" (Durbin 1996; p.36-44) . The article is about 
federal legislation that affects the Interior Columbia Basin 
in the western U.S. and the ensuing battles over this 
legislation. The article very briefly mentions that competing 
interests groups including environmentalists, antigovernment 
militias, Native Americans and recreational businesses and 
land-users all take differing sides on the degree to which 
ecosystems should be preserved in this region and through what 
measures. Again, two sides are equally presented (though not 
with much depth or detail) , the side of those in favor of 
conservation and the side of those in favor of use of natural 
resources without government restriction. NWF is in favor of 
conservation, but again, there is no elaboration on their 
position, nor is there any criticism of the opposition. Even 
when quoting ecosystem conservation proponents, a rather 
neutral statement is chosen. For example, Mike Bader, "the 
visionary behind the Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection 
Act" is quoted as saying, "So much of our economy is based on 
the big wild, outfitters, people who move here, even ranchers 
care about the wilderness" (Durbin 1996; p.3 6-44). So, we are 
given the impression, at least from this statement, that 
conservation is necessary, and that is necessary for the sake 
of the economy.
In the most recent issue of National Wildlife (April
1996), in an article titled "The NWF View," William Howard, 
President and Chief Executive Officer of NWF, writes that NWF
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wants to find a common ground between conservationists and 
industry. In an effort to find this common ground, NWF is 
proposing "Community-Based Recovery Planning, giving 
communities a larger say in how the Endangered Species Act is 
implemented. This includes giving people power to recommend 
exemptions for small land owners, so economic needs are not 
ignored" (Howard 1996; p.6). Thus it appears that, although 
NWF1 s mission is one of conservation, they are at least 
willing to compromise in the interest of local business 
owners. From this, at least, we can surmise that, for NWF, 
the principle of conservation is not absolutely inviolable. 
That is, it is not sacred.
A stated above, throughout the articles in National 
Wildlife, there does not appear to be any significant 
intellectual or ideological challenge presented to people or 
organizations that are opposed to resource conservation 
measures. There is definitely no evidence of challenge to our 
current dominant social paradigm. On the contrary, the 
magazine contains articles that reinforce American values, and 
all of the conservation efforts on which NWF reports 
characteristically are achieved by working within and through 
the federal government, with a focus on influencing 
legislation in favor of resource conservation. Federal 
policies are debated, but the structure and nature of the 
federal government is never an issue. For example, an article 
appeared in the February/March 1994 issue titled "Its the
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Ecosystem, Stupid!" in which the 26th Environmental Quality 
Index was used to critique the first 100 days of the Clinton 
administration in office. The article gave detailed accounts 
of environmental policy changes and scientific evidence of 
progress and setbacks in various areas of environmental 
concern such as water quality, air pollution, and use of 
pesticides. Criticisms were aimed at specific decisions, 
policies, lack of enforcement of and compliance with 
environmental regulations, and the condition of the 
environment. However, with the exception of a section which 
harshly criticized the effectiveness of the EPA, there were no 
criticisms of the American government itself or our system of 
government as a concept. "The system " itself was not 
challenged, only poor decisions made within that system and 
the people who made them.
Many American values are upheld and reinforced as 
American values by NWF such as individual participation in 
government, the right to free speech, and the right to take 
legal action against others (Speart 1994; p.12-15). 
Conservation itself is held up as a "traditional American 
value" (Howard 1996; p. 6) . The virtues of science, in 
particular, are held in very high esteem by NWF. They are 
held in esteem to the point that scientific and technological 
advances that are deemed helpful to the environment are 
enthusiastically reported, while the scientific and 
technological sources of environmental problems are seldom
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acknowledged.
For example, in the February/March 1994 issue, there 
appeared an article titled "Windows to the World" which 
describes how satellites are being used to monitor 
environmental destruction around the globe. Daniel Glick ,the 
author of the article enthusiastically explains the benefits 
of this technology, and how it has assisted scientists in 
identifying the Anarctic ozone hole, tracking "sea creatures," 
detecting crop damage from insect infestation, confirming the 
explosion at Chernobyl, and mapping the oil spill in the 
Persian Gulf (Glick 1994; p.6-8). There is no mention made of 
the fact that advances in science made it possible for there 
to be a hole in the ozone, for there to be an explosion at 
Chernobyl, and for there to be an oil spill in the Persian 
Gulf. Furthermore no mention is made by NWF that this same 
technology that is used to monitor global environmental 
destruction can be used by extracting corporations, who have 
much control over new technologies (Mander 1994), to much more 
efficiently locate natural resources for extraction, thus 
greatly contributing to the very environmental destruction 
that is monitored by these satellites. Only the positive uses 
of science and technology are presented in any detail. 
Science is even given authority over ethical issues. In a 
December/January 1994 article on debates between ranchers and 
conservationists, the author states, "Just what is good 
stewardship? The answers inevitably will be rooted in
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science" (Drew 1994; p.16).
The vast majority of the articles in National Wildlife
are about specific species of animals, and their 
characteristics and behaviors. The authors of these articles, 
as well as of all other articles viewed for this analysis, 
describe their topics (e.g. particular species, habitat 
destruction, condition of the environment, history of 
legislation) in very scientific terms, drawing especially from 
the fields of biology and environmental sciences. There is 
nothing in these articles to suggest that particular species 
or the Earth itself is sacred. Even when describing the 
magnificence of nature, it is described in highly scientific 
terms. The following excerpt from an article on endangered 
species illustrates this beautifully:
"Each species is consequently a source of 
scientific knowledge and aesthetic pleasure. The 
number of genes prescribing an organism belonging 
to a higher life-form (in other words more complex 
than bacterium) runs into hundreds of thousands; 
the nucleotide pairs composing them, the genetic 
letters that encode the life-giving enzymes, number 
according to species from 1 billion to 10 billion. 
If the DNA helices in one cell of a mouse ... were 
placed end on end and magically enlarged to the 
same width as a piece of wrapping string, they 
would extend for about 600 miles, with 20-odd 
nucleotide pairs packed into every inch. How all 
that genetic information translates into a
fully functioning organism is still partly a 
mystery. The lesson to be drawn is that the 
life-forms around us are too old, too complex and 
too valuable to be carelessly discarded" (Wilson 
1996; p. 17).
Even in this author's attempt to create a sense of awe 
with regard to a particular species, it is still ultimately 
presented as having value only insofar as it is useful to 
humans, i.e. it is profane. Of the articles read for this 
analysis, the article described above, which was titled "E.O. 
Wilson to the Defense" comes closest of any of them to 
defending the concept of conservancy on the basis of the 
"value" of endangered species. With regard to each species, 
he states, "It has a name, a million year history and a place 
in the world" (Wilson 1996; p. 17) . However, there is no 
elaboration of this point in the article and similar 
sentiments were not found elsewhere in this analysis, with the 
exception of a statement by William Howard that NWF has a 
"...vision of people and nature in balance" (Howard 1996; 
p.6), again with no elaboration on that point. The remainder 
of the articles were characteristically factual and value-free 
in their representation of animals and issues. It should be 
added, however, that the photography throughout the magazine 
is quite impressive in its capability of drawing out sentiment 
in favor of "saving" the animals that are photographed.
There is no discussion whatsoever in National Wildlife of
religious or spiritual values or of any particular worldview. 
Furthermore, no articles were found suggesting changes in 
lifestyle to its readers. From the magazine, it is apparent 
that NWF, while it exists to promote conservation of "wildlife 
and other natural resources," it does so through working
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within the system and poses no challenges to the dominant 
social paradigm, spiritually or otherwise. Therefore, as with 
Friends of the Earth, an individual could be affiliated with 
NWF and hold Judeo-Christian or other religious beliefs, or no 
religious beliefs at all, and not find himself adhering to 
diametrically opposed ideologies. Therefore, we have no 
reason to expect that one's membership in this organization 
would be found to be related to his religious affiliation or 
lack thereof.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between religion and human behavior 
toward the natural environment is more complex than is 
suggested by some of the earlier attempts to explain this 
relationship through survey research. Not only were the 
definitions of religion in that research too narrow; neither 
was there sufficient emphasis given to variation within the 
environmental movement. Just as the distinction between 
Judeo-Christian and non-Judeo-Christian is insufficient to 
describe variation among religions, the distinction between 
"high level of environmental concerns and behaviors" and "low 
level of environmental concerns and behaviors" is insufficient 
to describe variation among environmentalists. In survey 
research, reformist and radical environmentalists are likely 
to report high levels of environmental awareness and behaviors 
such as recycling or reduced consumption. However, the 
sources or axioms which guide their lifestyles vary 
considerably. Analysis of environmental movements which 
recognizes this variation suggests that it is among the 
"religious others" and "religious nones" in previous research 
that we would most likely find religion to be predictably 
related to environmental behaviors. We need only to ask the
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right questions.
The main difference between previous research on this 
topic and this paper is that previous research asks, "What 
prevents people from engaging in positive environmental 
behaviors?" while this project asks, "What inspires people to 
engage in positive environmental behaviors?" The previous 
research has searched for someone or something to blame (such 
as Christianity) whereas the goal behind this project was to 
illuminate something that motivates (such as nontraditional 
religious ideology). The present analysis argues that, within 
radical movements, there exist religious and quasi-religious 
beliefs that can motivate environmental behaviors that run 
against the grain of contemporary life. There was nothing in 
the reformist literature to suggest that the same relationship 
applies to members of reformist organizations.
As chapter seven demonstrated, a person of virtually any 
religious persuasion could affiliate with reformist 
environmental movements without contradicting his religious 
beliefs. The articles in National Wildlife give the
impression that the National Wildlife Federation purposefully 
remains ambiguous in terms of axiomatic frameworks. This may 
be one of NWF's strengths in terms of attracting a sizable 
membership. Even for those who view nature as sacred, and are 
offended by reformist movements' understanding of nature as 
"resources," many of the goals to which they aspire (e.g. 
conservation, species protection, reductions in pollution) are
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consistent with those of radical movements. Although a 
radical perspective may view reformist organizations as 
insufficient to address environmental problems, some of the 
radical movements' more moderate members may feel that the 
environmental movement as a whole could benefit from the 
contributions of those who work within the current social 
structure.
However, to what extent reformist organizations are 
capable of challenging the major industrial extractors and 
polluters is questionable since, " [Their] budgets show 
increased contributions from corporations and their boards 
include corporate executives" (Merchant 1992; p. 160). For 
example, "Only 22 percent of NWF's budget comes from members, 
with another 15 percent from magazine subscriptions for school 
children. Corporate donors include -Amoco, ARCO, Coca Cola, 
Dow, Dupont, Exxon, General Electric, General Motors, IBM, 
Mobil, Monsanto, Tenneco, Westinghouse, Weyerhouse, and ... 
USX (formerly U.S. Steel)" (Merchant 1992; p. 160-161). This 
would explain NWF's reluctance, in National Wildlife, to speak
out strongly against corporate attempts to interfere with 
conservation efforts . Friends of the Earth is also among the 
"Group of Ten" reformist environmental organizations, many of 
which receive funding from corporations (Merchant 1992; p. 
161) . If a reformist environmental organization hopes to 
increase the proportion of its funding received from 
non-corporate supporters, it cannot afford to alienate
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prospective supporters by challenging their religious, or even 
secular, beliefs.
In contrast, radical environmental movements challenge 
the dominant social paradigm at broad and deep levels. They 
demand not only changes in society and its institutional 
structures, but changes in the way the relationship between 
human and nonhuman nature is perceived. At its most 
fundamental level, the demand for a "new environmental 
paradigm" is, in essence, a demand for a "new religious 
paradigm. " This new religious paradigm is one that views 
nature, or at least the ethical principles that nature reveals 
to us, as sacred. The difference between the dominant 
religious paradigm and the new religious paradigm is not 
merely a difference between "anthropocentrism" and 
"biocentrism." It is a difference between the profane and the 
sacred, and which of these realms nature and its wisdom is 
believed to occupy. The presence or absence of this variable,
i.e. a belief in the sacredness in nature, is far more likely 
to be related to environmental practices than would be the 
presence or absence of Judeo-Christian affiliation.
It could be argued that the presence or absence of the 
sacralization of nature is identical to the presence or 
absence of a belief in human dominion over nature. In either 
case, a distinction is being made between nature as either 
sacred or profane. And, if we were conducting a survey several 
hundred years ago, when religion, particularly Christianity,
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was highly influential in both alternative and mainstream 
Western cultures, the presence or absence of Christianity may 
reveal the same relationships to environmental behaviors as 
the presence or absence of a belief in nature as sacred. 
However, we are not exploring the relationship of religion to 
environmental problems in medieval Europe. We are exploring 
the relationship of religion to environmental problems in the 
late 2 0th century, when day-to-day life for the majority of 
those in Western culture is guided by secular institutions and 
a predominantly secular environmental paradigm. As stated 
throughout this project, those who live according to our 
culture's dominant social paradigm probably engage in 
environmental practices which do not require any religious 
commitment to maintain. Therefore, affiliation with a 
religion (i.e. Christianity) that supports the DSP (dominant 
social paradigm) may be, for the most part, inconsequential.
For those who do not choose to adhere to the DSP, 
however, society is structured in such a way as to make 
adherence to the new environmental paradigm very difficult 
(chapter 3) . Since one would encounter many obstacles to 
leading an alternative environmental lifestyle, doing so would 
require intense commitment to the beliefs and values that 
guide one's daily life. The analysis of radical movements 
presented in chapters five and six indicate that some of these 
beliefs are indeed religious or quasi-religious and comprise 
a system of beliefs that can, using Durkheimian definitions,
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properly be described as a new religious paradigm. If 
Durkheim is correct in his claim that religion is more 
powerful than secular institutions in inspiring one to 
"...rise above himself ...[and] ...subdue his own nature to 
the point of making it follow a way contrary to the one it 
would spontaneously take" {Durkheim 1915; p. 355) , then 
recognition of the religious nature of many aspects of the new 
environmental paradigm is essential to addressing 
environmental problems.
A variety of writers concerned with environmental issues 
were referenced during the course of this project (e.g. 
Ehrlich, Naess, Bookchin, Sessions, Devall, Gould and 
Schnaiberg, Mander, Catton), and although they differed from 
one another on many points, the majority seemed to be in 
agreement that current methods of environmental "problem 
solving" within our society are simply not enough. Recycling, 
buying "greener" products, reducing consumption, having 
smaller families, etc., are all undeniably important, but they 
are not sufficient. Not only do many of these writer insist 
that structural and institutional changes are necessary, but 
they also consistently point out that individual and community 
lifestyles must change far more significantly than they have 
in order to avoid an environmental catastrophe within the next 
few decades (if not sooner). Even if their warnings are not 
attached to any radical theory or ideology, they nonetheless
give the impression that radical changes in lifestyle are
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needed. The question then arises as to what could possibly 
inspire people to make such radical changes in their lives? 
Previous chapters discussed three groups of people who have 
made or are advocating such radical lifestyle changes: 
back-to-the-land movement adherents, deep ecologists, and 
social ecologists. Although they converge and diverge on 
various points, they all have one thing in common; their 
lifestyles are inspired and maintained by religious ideology. 
If those immersed in mainstream consumerist culture are to 
follow the examples of radical movement adherents then, will 
giving them "the facts" about environmental issues be 
sufficient to bring about such lifestyle changes? Or, must 
paradigmatic changes occur on a spiritual level before such 
lifestyle changes can be maintained? Future research on 
environmental attitudes and practices should be guided by 
these questions.
Furthermore, researchers should pay careful attention to 
the quality of the environmental practices that they explore. 
Are they trying to determine how particular variables relate 
to particular environmental practices within mainstream 
culture or how particular variables relate to entire 
lifestyles, such as those of the back-to-the-land movement, 
traditional Native Americans, or deep ecology's "minority 
tradition?" It is the opinion of this author that the 
emphasis should be on those environmental practices that 
constitute a radical change in lifestyle since, as mentioned
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above, anything less than that is insufficient for bringing 
about the changes that many of the sources for this paper deem 
necessary to avoid a global environmental catastrophe.
The generalizability of this project is debatable. It 
definitely lends support to the argument that ideology is 
highly significant to radical social movements. For radical 
environmental movements, virtually all of physical reality and 
every relationship within it can potentially be called into 
question. Discourse on such limitless issues, therefore, 
readily lends itself to metaphysical or theological 
discussion, especially when considering what humanity ought to
do. This may not be true of other types of radical social 
movements, at least not to the same degree as with radical 
environmental movements. However, one could reasonably expect 
that, the more radical a movement is, i.e. the more 
fundamentally it challenges the dominant social paradigm of 
its culture, the more religious or quasi-religious ideology 
will be influential to the movement.
With environmental movements, this appears to be the 
case. Therefore, if environmental problems require radical 
solutions, researchers must give at least equal attention to 
religion as they do secular institutions. Instead of viewing 
religion as unimportant to environmental issues, perhaps we 
should take the approach that religion is important to
environmental issues precisely because there is a lack of a
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relationship between the two within our dominant culture. 
Perhaps the resacralization of nature is a missing cornerstone 
to our society, without which sufficient environmental changes 
cannot be accomplished.
APPENDIX A
The following items appear on the New Environmental Paradigm
Scale devised by Riley Dunlap and Kent D. Van Liere:
1. We are approaching the limit to the number of people the 
Earth can support.
2. The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.
3. Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to 
suit their needs.
4. Mankind was created to rule over the rest of nature.
5. When humans interfere with nature it often produces 
disastrous consequences.
6. Plants and animals exist primarily to be used by humans.
7. To maintain a healthy economy we will have to develop a 
"steady-state" economy where industrial growth is 
controlled.
8. Humans must live in harmony with nature in order to 
survive.
9. The earth is like a spaceship with only limited room and 
resources.
10. Humans need not adapt to the natural environment because 
they can remake it to suit their needs.
11. There are limits to growth beyond which our industrialized 
society cannot expand.
12. Mankind is severely abusing the environment.
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NOTES
1. Whether or not the societies Durkheim chose to study 
are in fact the most basic is, of course, debatable. One 
characteristic of these societies that is central to his 
argument is that they are hierarchical, which is then reflected 
in the societies' religious interpretations of the world. This 
emphasis on hierarchical societies should be kept in mind when 
applying Durkheim's theory to Social Ecology since Murray 
Bookchin (the movements founder and primary spokesperson) gives 
considerable emphasis to nonhierarchical or prehierarchical 
communities and their beliefs pertaining 
to the relationship between man and nature.
2. The phrase "Dominant Social Paradigm" or DSP was 
initially used by D.C. Pirages and P.R. Ehrlich in 1974 to 
refer to "...a worldview 'through which individuals, or 
collectively, a society interpret the meaning of the external 
world'" (Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; p.10). Included in the DSP 
of current Western culture are " . ..belief in abundance and 
progress, devotion to growth and prosperity, faith in science 
and technology, and commitment to laissez-faire economy, 
limited government planning and private property rights" 
(Dunlap and Van Liere 1978; p.10).
3. The argument made by Kanagy and Willits here does not 
address the fact that two out of twelve items of the NEP Scale 
(items 4 and 6) could easily be construed as referring to 
religious beliefs. The remaining items on the scale, however, 
are predominantly secular in orientation (see Appendix A ) .
4. Hierarchy is defined by Bookchin as "...the cultural, 
traditional, and psychological systems of obedience and 
command, not merely the economic and political systems to which 
the terms class and State most appropriately refer" (Bookchin 
1991; p.4).
5. When Bookchin discusses religion, he is referring to 
a belief in otherworldly deities or a belief in the 
supernatural. Therefore, since, for Bookchin, such beliefs are 
characteristics of hierarchical societies, religion, so 
defined, would only be found in those societies which are 
structured hierarchically. The animism of the nonhierarchical 
societies which he discusses, insofar as it is not 
characterized by a belief in otherworldly beings or in 
supernatural entities, is not, for Bookchin, a religion. 
Rather, he uses the term "sensibilities" to describe these 
all-encompassing beliefs about the relationships among al
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5. (cont.) humans and nonhumans in the natural world. 
These "sensibilities" however, qualify as religious or at least 
quasi-religious beliefs according to the definition used for 
this project (chapter 4) .
6. An "ethics of complementarity" is one "in which human 
beings must play a supportive role in perpetuating the 
integrity of the biosphere" (Bookchin 1993; p.3 69).
7. By democracy, Bookchin is referring to, "...the 
democratic polis of Athens some two thousand years ago: the
formation of policy by popular assemblies and their 
administration by mandated, carefully supervised boards of 
coordinators who could easily be recalled if they failed to 
abide by the decisions of the assembly's citizens" (Bookchin 
1993; p.371). Social ecology advocates a return to this form 
of democracy and citizen participation with the exclusion of 
slavery and patriarchy which characterized Athenian culture.
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